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Reforming Redistricting:
Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting
Commissions Succeed or Fail
Nicholas Stephanopoulos*
INTRODUCTION

Redistricting in America is rotten. Across the country, for elections of
every level, district lines are drawn in such a way that fundamental
democratic values are subverted. Sometimes districts take on bizarre
shapes as legislators add and subtract people in order to assure a particular
political profile. Sometimes distinct political communities-say, rural
farmers or inner-city minorities-are split apart by district lines or merged
with other very different communities. Sometimes districts are blatantly
skewed toward one party even though the state as a whole is politically
competitive. Sometimes, thanks to clever district-drawing, the distribution
of seats in a state legislature or congressional delegation has little
correlation to a state's overall voting pattern. And, very often, all these
sins are combined. When looking at a district map, it is not unusual to see
oddly shaped districts that divide political communities, virtually guarantee
reelection for incumbents, and enable one party to win a much higher
proportion of legislative seats than popular votes.
There are several ways in which redistricting abuses could be combated,
but unfortunately most are unlikely to transpire. Congress' and state
*Associate, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington D.C.. J.D., 2006, Yale Law School; M.Phil,
University of Cambridge, 2002; A.B., Harvard University, 2001. My thanks are due above all to
Heather Gerken, who initially suggested this Article's subject and supported me throughout the writing
and revision process. I am also grateful to Melissa Anderson, Owen Fiss, David Fontana, Nathaniel
Persily, Robert Post, Reva Siegel, Larry Solan, and Daniel Zaheer for their assorted contributions to the
piece. An abridged version of this Article was published in Spring 2007 as an American Constitution
Society Issue Brief.
The Constitution explicitly states that "Congress may at any time by law make or alter ...
regulations" relating to "[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Congress has exercised this authority several times in the past. The Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat.
491, required that House districts elect a single member and consist of contiguous territory. The
Apportionment Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 572, reiterated these requirements, and the Apportionment Act of
1872, 17 Stat. 28, § 2, added the further condition that districts "contain[] as nearly as practicable an
equal number of inhabitants." In 1901, Congress also insisted on district compactness, Apportionment
Act of 1901, 31 Stat. 733, and in 1911, Congress renewed these requirements of contiguity,
compactness, and equipopulation, Apportionment Act of 1911, 37 Stat. 13. However, Congress did not
extend the 1911 requirements when they expired, and has failed to pass any new redistricting
legislation over the past ninety years. Today the only federal statutory limitation on redistricting is the
requirement that all House districts elect a single member. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000).
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legislatures 2 could pass laws imposing certain requirements-for example,
contiguity, compactness, preservation of political communities-on the
district-drawing process. But legislators are the primary beneficiaries of
the redistricting status quo, and therefore have a strong incentive not to
change the rules that allow them to be reelected time after time. Courts
could also intervene by invalidating especially egregious gerrymanders.
But the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Vieth v. Jubelirer3 and League
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry4 all but foreclosed
federal judicial relief, at least on equal protection grounds. A plurality of
the Court held in Vieth (and affirmed in LULAC) that political
gerrymandering is never justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, and
the remaining justices splintered over what the constitutional standard
should be (and whether it has yet been discovered). 5 As for state courts,
Sam Hirsch has noted that it is "difficult to convince [them] not to follow
lockstep the U.S. Supreme Court's . . . jurisprudence," and that the

Elections Clause arguably "bars a state court from applying state
constitutional law to invalidate a congressional map enacted by the state
legislature." 6
Legislators' self-interest and adverse court decisions leave critics of
contemporary redistricting with only one promising avenue for reform: the
popular initiative. The initiative, available in some form in twenty-four
states,7 enables the general public to place statutory and constitutional
2

Several states have either adopted standards for redistricting, or decided by statute to allow

bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions to draw district lines. See, e.g., HAW.REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1993);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1506 (1999); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
1206 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-115 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (1994). But such
states are in the minority, and their reforms typically do not apply to federal elections.
3541 U.S. 267 (2004).
4 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006).
5 Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's judgment but wrote separately to express his view that
simply because "no [justiciable] standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that
none will emerge in the future." 541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also
LULAC, 126 S.Ct. at 2607 ("A plurality of the Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer would have held such
challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority declined to do so."). The LULAC
Court rejected yet another proposed standard for detecting unconstitutional political gerrymandering: a
presumption that mid-decade redistricting is conducted solely for partisan ends and therefore violates
the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
6 Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest
Round of CongressionalRedistricting,2 ELECTION L.J. 179,210-11 (2003).
7 See Initiative & Referendum Institute, State I &R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide-i
percent26r.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). Forty-nine states (all but Delaware) require popular
approval for constitutional amendments passed by the legislature. Initiative & Referendum Institute,
Amendments,
Constitutional
for Statutes and
Legislative Referendum
States with
percent20Info/Drop
percent20Website
percent20IRI
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New
percent20Down percent 20Boxes/RequirementsfLegislative percent20Referendum percent2OStates.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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proposals directly on the ballot. After enough signatures are garnered,
both legislatures and courts are circumvented, and the people themselves
are able to decide if, for example, certain standards should be followed
during redistricting or a commission should draw district lines instead of
the legislature.
Redistricting initiatives-in the wake of Vieth and LULAC the only
realistic way to curb political gerrymanderingS -are the subject of this
Article. Part I discusses the merits of the initiative in the redistricting
context, and evaluates the bipartisan commission (the approach taken by
almost every redistricting initiative) relative to other anti-gerrymandering
mechanisms. The section argues that the popular initiative is particularly
well-suited to combating gerrymandering because it allows voters to
bypass the self-interested politicians who typically thwart efforts to make
redistricting fairer. The section also contends, on the basis of political
theory and empirical evidence, that the bipartisan commission is, on the
whole, well-designed to prevent gerrymandering and improve redistricting.
Part II begins to confront the biggest problem with redistricting
initiatives: the fact that they generally fail. The section first presents a
series of factors that have been identified by scholars and other observers
as potential explanations for initiatives' success or failure. The section
then examines in detail the twelve cases in which initiatives were launched
to regulate redistricting. Each initiative's official language, political
backdrop, principal supporters and opponents, campaign dynamics, and
eventual outcome are described. In addition, tentative conclusions are
reached about why each initiative passed or (more typically) was defeated.
Finally, Part III takes a more holistic approach to the twelve
redistricting initiatives. The section analyzes all the initiatives together in
order to identify factors that were relevant to success or failure across a
range of cases, offers recommendations that advocates of redistricting
reform should follow in the future, and discusses the Article's implications
for the academic conventional wisdom on why initiatives succeed or fail.
The section's main finding is that redistricting initiatives always fail when
they are strongly opposed by the majority party in the state legislature, and
only succeed when some factor-for example, favorable national
developments, the enthusiastic support of the state's media establishment,
8Redistricting initiatives are clearly a second-best solution since they must be conducted separately
in each state, and are unavailable entirely in twenty-six states. It would be better to regulate
gerrymandering across the entire country in one swoop, either through congressional or federal judicial
action. But, as argued above, national action is virtually impossible because of federal legislators' selfinterest and unfavorable Supreme Court doctrine.
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dissension between the majority party's executive branch officials and its
legislators--defuses majority party opposition. The upshot for reformers is
that they should wait for auspicious political moments before launching
redistricting initiatives, and try at all costs to stop the majority party from
presenting a unified front of opposition to the measure. And the lesson for
academics is that the traditional theory of initiative outcomes, which
downplays the importance of political parties, is wrong as applied to
redistricting initiatives. Not only do parties' positions and campaigning
influence redistricting initiative outcomes, they hold more explanatory
power than any other factor.
I. THE CASE FOR THE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVE AND COMMISSION

Before delving into the details of the twelve redistricting initiatives, it is
important to ask whether initiatives are a good idea in the redistricting
context, and whether their typical approach-the creation of a redistricting
commission-is an appropriate cure for the ills of gerrymandering. This
Part argues that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Popular
initiatives are especially well-suited to the redistricting context because it
is an area where legislators' self-interest often trumps the pursuit of the
public good. And redistricting commissions, while not a perfect solution
to rampant political gerrymandering, are theoretically and empirically
superior to the status quo.
A. The RedistrictingInitiative
When the initiative and referendum 9 were first proposed at the turn of
the twentieth century, their supporters tended to view them as a panacea to
many of the afflictions of politics. Woodrow Wilson believed that they
would remind politicians that "they are bound in duty ... to represent the
sovereign people . . . and not the private interests which creep into their
counsels." 10 Harvard professor Lewis Jerome Johnson argued that,
"[s]upplemented by the initiative and referendum . . . the representative
system will gradually but surely enter upon a period of honor and
usefulness hitherto never surpassed and probably never equaled."" And
9 Initiatives are placed directly on the ballot after enough signatures are obtained. Referenda
subject a legislative enactment to a popular vote.
'0Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 69, 88
(William Bennett Munro ed., 1912).
" Lewis Jerome Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL, supra note 10, at 139, 147.
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California Governor Hiram Johnson, a prominent Progressive, claimed that
after his state adopted the initiative and referendum, "the prosperity of the
State [would be] assured, exaction and extortion from the people will be at
an end,"12 and "development and progress will follow as a matter of
course."
But the century in which they have been in use has stripped some of the
bloom off the initiative and referendum rose. According to critics, the
expense of placing a proposition on the ballot and then conducting an
effective campaign for it makes it difficult for ordinary people to
participate in the initiative and referendum process, and results in
domination by well-heeled special interests.1 3 In addition, precisely
because they evade the normal checks and balances of the legislative
process, initiatives and referenda can more easily be used to abridge
individual rights. As Julian Eule writes, "direct democracy bypasses
internal safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice,
tyranny, and self-interest., 14 Furthermore, initiatives and referenda may
result in an undesirable distortion of public policy. "The legislative process
provides for debate over alternatives, compromise, and consensus or
agreement," while initiatives and referenda present voters with a single
proposition that must be approved or rejected in its entirety.1 5 Finally, the
evidence that initiatives and referenda improve deliberation on important
issues is slim. In fact, voter turnout is usually far lower in special elections
for initiatives and referenda than in normal elections.
Fortunately, this critique of direct democracy has limited force in the
redistricting context. Redistricting initiatives do not endanger individual
rights since all they seek to do is change the process by which electoral
district lines are drawn. They do not interfere with the complicated
negotiating and favor-trading of the legislative process since they involve
no serious spending and need not be balanced against other agenda items.
Because of their diffuse impact and fiscally neutral posture, there is no
12
Hiram
Johnson,
Inaugural
Address
(Jan.
3,
1911),
available
at
http://www.califomiagovemors.ca.gov/h/documents/inaugural_23.html.
13See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1845, 1853 (1999) ("As money becomes the only certain route to ballot access, the character of direct
democracy is increasingly determined by those with financial resources."); Jamin B. Raskin, Direct
Democracy, Corporate Power and JudicialReview of Popularly-EnactedCampaignFinanceReform, I
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22 (1997) ("[W]hether our laws emerge from legislative process or
plebiscite, far too many of them are being shaped and determined by the expenditure and contribution
of huge sums of money by interested corporate factions.").
14Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1549 (1990).

15DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 29 (1984).
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special interest group that consistently benefits from the passage of
redistricting initiatives. And, while not as simple and provocative as some
cultural issues, the question of who should draw district lines-the
legislature or a commission-is easily understood by voters.
Most importantly, redistricting initiatives are attractive because, to use
John Hart Ely's phrase, they promise to "unblock[] stoppages in the
democratic process. 16 Redistricting is a context in which legislators'
incentives and the public interest are almost diametrically opposed.
Legislators want to win reelection handily and to have their party obtain as
many seats as possible. Under almost any theory of democracy, on the
other hand, the public is more interested in elections whose outcome is not
a foregone conclusion, districts that respect preexisting political
communities, and legislatures whose partisan composition roughly reflects
actual vote totals. Redistricting initiatives enable the public to rescue their
interests from legislative hijacking. Substantive standards (for example,
contiguity, compactness, competitiveness, preservation of political
communities) can be imposed on redistricting, or a more neutral districtdrawing process instituted, without legislators-whose rejection of such
proposals is a virtual certainty-having anything to say about the matter.
As a recent HarvardLaw Review Note observes, direct democracy, when it
addresses flaws in the electoral and legislative process,
is playing precisely the role that it should: it checks
dysfunctional government.... [D]irect democracy is most
effective when partisan politics or special-interest
influence has so distorted the proper operation of political
markets that democratic government ceases to be
responsive to voters' concerns. Just as scholars have
advocated an enhanced judicial role when "the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out," so too can
and
direct democracy promote more responsive
7
representative government in such situations.'
Redistricting initiatives are by no means without their blemishes. As
Part II discusses in detail, voters are not always very informed or excited
16JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).
17 Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2748, 2764-65 (2005)
(internal citations omitted).
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about them, their accompanying media campaigns are often extremely
misleading, and sinister motives are sometimes alleged to lurk behind the
proposals' technical details. Moreover, the intrinsic state-by-state nature
of direct democracy means that redistricting reform by initiative must
unfold slowly and incrementally, rather than in a single national legislative
or judicial thunderclap. Still, on balance, the case for redistricting
initiatives is strong. Unlike many other initiatives, they do not supplicate
to special interests, upset delicate budgetary balances, or harm minority
groups. And, as long as legislative and judicial paths to reform remain
blocked, they represent the only realistic way for the evils of
gerrymandering to be redressed.
B. The Redistricting Commission
Redistricting initiatives could in principle operate in several ways. They
could allow the legislature to continue drawing districts, but require that
certain rules about the districts' shape and composition be followed. They
could abolish single-member districts entirely and replace them with a
proportional representation or other electoral system.1 8 They could create a
nonpartisan or bipartisan commission and grant it complete freedom to
devise the district map it thinks is best. Or they could create a commission
and limit its discretion by imposing various requirements on the districts
that it draws.
In practice, every one of the twelve redistricting initiatives has taken the
last of these approaches: establishing a commission by constitutional
amendment, and then providing the commission with various rules to
follow as it goes about drawing district lines. The main contrasts among
the initiatives have involved the bodies to be reapportioned (state
legislature and/or congressional delegation), the standards to be used by
the commissions, and the size, composition, and selection of the
commissions. Appendix A, infra, summarizes the main features of the
twelve redistricting initiatives.
Because the initiatives have been so similar, it is worth examining how
compelling their solution to political gerrymandering-a commission with
prescribed standards-is. In my view, the commission is quite a good
solution. 19 First, and most critically, the members of redistricting
18 This

would only be possible for state elections. Federal law requires that all Representatives be

elected through single-member districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000).
19Redistricting commissions enjoy wide support in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 173-75

(2002); Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People's Business: An Examination of the Utility of
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commissions are not self-interested legislators. Who exactly the members
are varies from initiative to initiative z° but in no case are the very
politicians who will soon be running for reelection allowed to draw the
district lines themselves. This feature of commissions encourages values
other than the legislators' self-interest to be pursued, such as district
competitiveness, the preservation of political communities, and the
achievement of electoral results that broadly mirror the public's political
preferences. 2' Of course, commission members are not politically agnostic
saints; under the terms of several of the twelve initiatives, in fact, they may
be executive branch officials or staunch partisans appointed by state party
leaders. But the fact that commission members' own careers will not be
directly affected by the district maps that they draw frees them to focus on
the public good (or, at least, to consider it more seriously than legislators
do). The bipartisan nature of many commissions, with an equal number of
each major party's backers as well as, typically, a neutral chairperson
elected by the political appointees, 22 also prevents commission members
from blatantly flouting democratic values. Any redistricting proposal that
promises to result in disproportionate electoral success for one party
inevitably provokes fierce opposition from the other party's supporters and
the chairperson.23
Second, redistricting that is conducted by a commission enjoys greater
public legitimacy than redistricting carried out by the state legislature. As
Jeffrey Kubin notes, the latter method "fosters disillusionment with the
democratic process because it more deeply ingrains upon the American
Nonpolitical/BipartisanLegislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 115
(2004); Robinson 0. Everett, Lessons from North Carolina'sRedistrictingLitigation, 6 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 205, 221 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, JudgingPolitics: The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1647, 1691-98 (1993); Gene R. Nichol, The Practice of
Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 1029, 1030 (2001); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for
Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997).
20 See infra Appendix A. The three principal formulas for commission composition are 1) for
certain state officials (e.g. the governor, the secretary of state) to be on the commission ex officio; 2)
for designated state officials (e.g. the governor, legislature majority and minority leaders, state party
leaders) to appoint the commission members; and 3) for retired judges to staff the commission.
21 See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1030 ("I am inclined to believe that independent redistricting
commissions are less political than their legislative counterparts."); Kubin, supra note 19, at 858 ("The
legislative independence of... commissioners also affords them greater flexibility to adhere to a state's
constitutionally mandated redistricting criteria.").
22 See Appendix A, infra. A variation of this formula was proposed in North Dakota (1973),
Arizona (2000), and Ohio (2005). Many states that have adopted redistricting commissions through
legislative action (as opposed to an initiative) also have bipartisan commissions.
23 See Kubin, supra note 19, at 856 ("Fundamentally, tie-breaking commissions provide for a fair
fight because the majority party cannot run roughshod over the minority party as it would be able to in
an unevenly split legislature.").
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psyche the image of politicians as self-interested actors feathering their
own nests. ' 4 Oddly shaped districts, very high reelection rates, seat counts
that do not correspond to vote counts-all these ills may be blamed on
self-serving politicians when the legislature draws the district lines, with
the result that the public's faith in government declines and its cynicism
swells. In contrast, when elections conducted pursuant to a commission's
district map fall short of perfection, people at least know that the rules of
the game were drafted by someone other than the game's actual
contestants.
Third, entrusting redistricting to a commission allows the legislature to
devote more attention to issues of greater concern to the public. It is true
that redistricting (typically) takes place only once per decade, but it is a
very time-consuming process that generates a great deal of animosity
among legislators battling for personal and partisan advantage.
A
governor's veto or a court's invalidation of the legislature's plan, both
quite common in the redistricting context, can further protract the process
and intensify legislators' antagonism. But when a commission draws
district lines, both the time-drain and the poisonous side effects of
legislative redistricting are averted.2 6
Empirical evidence confirms that elections in states with commissions
are superior in several respects to elections in states without
commissions. 27 Andrew Gelman and Gary King conducted a study of all
lower house elections in thirty states over a twenty-year period. They
found that when a single party controls redistricting, it wins on average 3
percent more seats than it would have obtained if a commission handled
redistricting or if control over the legislature was split.2 8 That is, a party

that would have won 100 seats under a bipartisan commission's plan will
typically win 103 seats if it is able to draw the district lines itself. At the
24 Id. at
25

860.
See Confer, supra note 19, at 126 ("Bipartisan or nonpartisan legislative redistricting

commissions increase the legitimacy of the entire redistricting process by removing the most selfinterested group, the political parties, from control over the process.").
26 See id at 128 ("The primary advantage gained by allowing redistricting to be done by
nonpolitical or bipartisan redistricting commissions is that the legislature can take the time previously
spent on redistricting and spend it in pursuit of its primary responsibility - being about the people's
business.").
27 See also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366,

1388 (2005) (noting that

redistricting commissions have been "singularly effective"); id. at 1390 ("Many districting
commissions that purport to be nonpartisan have acquired a reputation (among informed local
observers) for fulfilling their mission with integrity.").
28 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88

AM. POL. Sci. REV. 541,553 (1994).
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federal level, I compared 2004 election results in the four states that
employ redistricting commissions and have more than two congressional
seats-Arizona, Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington-to results in the
forty-three states that do not use commissions to redistrict their
congressional delegations.29 I found that candidates' average margin of
victory was smaller in the commission states than the non-commission
states (30.0 percent versus 36.6 percent), election turnout was higher (59.9
percent versus 57.7 percent), and the divergence between a major party's
proportion of votes and its proportion of congressional seats was smaller
(10.5 percent versus 16.2 percent).30
Redistricting plans drafted by commissions are also less likely to be
challenged in court, and more likely to be upheld when they are
challenged. Christopher Confer analyzed lawsuits involving the district
maps of the seven states-Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania-that use commissions for state legislature
redistricting but not for congressional redistricting. He found that, after the
1980 census, five of the seven congressional plans were invalidated but
none of the state plans were struck down (and only two were even
litigated). 3'
After the 1990 census, similarly, two of the seven
congressional plans were declared invalid while only one state plan was
(and that state plan, for the Arkansas state legislature, was the product of a
commission composed solely of executive branch officials).

32

As for the

four states that employ commissions for both state and federal redistricting,
the 1980 and 1990 cycles together saw only one state plan and one federal
plan invalidated.33
Elections carried out after redistricting by a
commission, then, appear to result in less litigation, a tighter correlation
between a party's vote and seat totals, and, at least at the federal level,
more voter participation and more competitive races.

29

I did not consider the three states that use commissions but have only one or two congressional

seats (Hawaii, Idaho, and Montana) because it is impossible to draw any conclusions about elections in
such a small number of districts. It should also be noted that Iowa's commission is technically
advisory only, but its proposals have almost always been followed by the Iowa legislature.
30 For 2004 election data, see Fairvote, Voting and Democracy Research, Dubious
Democracy

2005 Data, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=722 (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). Because of the small
number of commission states, none of the differences between commission and non-commission states
are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The probability that the differences did not arise due
to chance are 88 percent for the average margin of victory, 35 percent for turnout, 85 percent for
Democratic seat-to-vote divergence, and 73 percent for Republican seat-to-vote divergence.
31Confer, supra note 19, at 132. If anything, one would expect state legislature redistricting
maps
to be more likely to be invalidated because of the far greater number of seats involved.
32 id.
33
1d. at 131.

HeinOnline -- 23 J.L. & Pol. 340 2007

2007]

Reforming Redistricting

Like redistricting initiatives, redistricting commissions are far from
flawless. If party representation on a commission is unbalanced, as is the
case in several states, the commission may be just as dominated by partisan
self-interest as the state legislature. Even if the commission has an equal
number of supporters of each major party, the outcome of the redistricting
process may be a "sweetheart gerrymander," where parties' seats
correspond to their support among voters but districts are drawn in such a
way that incumbents coast effortlessly to victory. Furthermore, the near
impossibility after Vieth and LULAC of challenging redistricting plans on
partisan gerrymandering grounds means that there is no effective judicial
If they disregard the specified
check on commissions' actions.34
redistricting criteria, or create a district map as flawed as that of any
legislature, there is very little that the courts can do. 35 Finally, some critics
argue that even if commissions "work"-by making elections more
competitive and legislative power more proportional to voter support-this
is not necessarily a good thing.3 6 More competition may undermine party
cohesion by weakening party leaders' hold on their seats and prompting
candidates in close races to deviate from the party line. And more
proportional representation may hamper the state majority party's ability to
pass legislation, and, at the congressional level, hurt the national party that
would otherwise have enjoyed a disproportionate majority of the state's
seats.3 7
I do not find these arguments against redistricting commissions
persuasive. The potential negative consequences of unbalanced and
bipartisan commissions are belied by the empirical evidence cited above;
even if such commissions in theory might produce gerrymanders of various
sorts, in practice they have not tended to do so. Moreover, even if
34 Challenges to redistricting plans on racial gerrymandering grounds-both under the Equal
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act-remain available even after Vieth and LULAC.
35 For a rare example of a court striking down a commission plan for failure to follow all of the
specified redistricting criteria, see In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d
185, 194-96 (Colo, 1992) (upholding most of the Colorado commission's 1990 legislative redistricting
plan but invalidating the split of two counties, which violated the requirement that counties not be
unnecessarily divided).
36See Confer, supra note 19, at 133-38.
37For example, if California were to start redistricting by commission, its congressional delegation,
currently made up of 33 Democrats and 20 Republicans, would likely become more evenly split. This
might be a "fairer" result, but it would substantially harm the national Democratic Party. For a state to
begin redistricting its congressional delegation by commission in a context where most states do not,
then, arguably amounts to unilateral disarmament. See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymanderingand
DisaggregatedRedistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 409, 450 n. 118 (2004) ("If [redistricting reforms]
were successful in only a few states (or if there were a consistent partisan alignment among the states
most likely to enact such reforms by initiative), the use of commissions might exacerbate certain
harms.").
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accurate, the critique of unbalanced and bipartisan commissions proves
only that commissions with a particular composition do not function
well-not that all commissions are intrinsically flawed. In particular, a
commission made up of nonpartisan experts, like the one used by Iowa,
should result in neither a one-party nor a bipartisan gerrymander.
As for the argument that rigorous judicial review of commissions'
actions is unavailable, it merely suggests that there should be such judicial
review.
And in the absence of any way to regulate partisan
gerrymandering in the courts, it is even more important that an independent
party, not the self-interested legislators, draw the district lines. Samuel
Issacharoff goes so far as to contend that courts should not even try to
"police redistricting outcomes ex post," and instead "should forbid ex ante
the participation of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process. 3 8
Finally, it is true that greater electoral competition and more proportional
representation are not unalloyed goods; in the complex realm of elections,
no goal can ever be achieved without some compromise. The key point,
though, is that competition and some rough measure of proportional
representation are far more fundamental to the democratic process than
party cohesion and legislative efficiency. Democracy is in part about
unified parties and effective lawmaking-but its essence is the translation
of the popular will into public policy, and this deeper mission is advanced
by redistricting commissions and undermined by the status quo.
II. THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES
Redistricting commissions promise to improve American democracy,
and the popular initiative is an attractive way to establish commissions in
states where the legislature refuses to act. The great puzzle, then, is why
most redistricting initiatives fail and why a select few succeed.39 Solving
this puzzle is critically important for proponents of redistricting reform,
who need to know when and where to launch initiatives, and under what
circumstances to hold their fire. The frequent failure and occasional
success of redistricting initiatives are also perplexing to legal scholars and
political scientists, most of whom would expect such initiatives-in the

38Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and PoliticalCartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593,643 (2002).

39Studies of why initiatives of a specific sort succeed or fail are rare. There are no studies of which
I am aware attempting to explain why redistricting initiatives succeed or fail.
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interests of the general public, and opposed mainly by self-interested
legislators-generally to prevail.4 °
This Part begins the effort to get to the bottom of the mystery. It first
outlines a series of factors that might explain redistricting initiatives'
success or failure. Some of these variables have been identified by
political scientists as significant in the initiative context, while others
emerged as important over the course of my research. The Part next
describes the salient features of the twelve redistricting initiatives that have
taken place over the course of American history, and offers some tentative
explanations for why each initiative succeeded or failed.
A. Variables
What are the variables that might explain the electoral success or failure
of redistricting initiatives? Several political scientists, first, have identified
campaign spending as a critical factor. According to Elizabeth Garrett,
studies "have uniformly concluded that money plays a large role in
[initiative] campaigns, particularly when it is spent to defeat ballot
questions."' 4 1 Deep pockets allow politicians and interest groups to obtain
access to the ballot-typically a difficult task because of the large number
of signatures required-and more effectively to broadcast their message to
the public. As a result, 78 percent of initiative campaigns are won by the
side that spends more money, and opponents of a measure who outspend
its backers win 90 percent of the time.42 Second, some (more optimistic)
scholars argue that initiatives' outcomes depend on voters' appraisal of the
proposals' pros and cons. Rich Braunstein's data indicates that "inclusive"
measures succeed at a higher rate than "exclusive" measures that primarily
benefit a particular interest group (65.5 percent versus 43.5 percent), and
that measures that increase citizens' decision-making power succeed 73
percent of the time.4 3 Similarly, Andrew Skalaban's analysis of two
40

Cf RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT

DEMOCRACY INTHE UNITED STATES 110 (2004) (presenting data that government and political process
initiatives succeed at a higher rate than any other type of initiative).
41Garrett, supra note 13, at 1847.
42 BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 75-77; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY,
LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 182-86 (1998) (46 percent of

California initiatives with one-sided spending in favor succeeded, and 90 percent of California
initiatives with one-sided spending in opposition failed). Contra MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 147 ("By
spending considerably more than the opposition, can a group pass an initiative into law? ....The best
available evidence indicates that this is typically not the case."); John R. Owens & Larry L. Wade,
Campaign Spending on CaliforniaBallot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects, 39 W.
POL. Q. 675, 688 (1986) ("Money has simply been overemphasized as a determinant of voting on direct
legislation.")
43BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55, 67.
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California term limits initiatives suggests that voters have the "ability to
by voting for
make a sophisticated choice between competing initiatives
4
other."
the
against
and
ideal
their
to
closest
one
the
Third, the positions taken by elites-major newspapers, interest groups,
prominent politicians, etc.-arguably affect the likelihood that an initiative
will pass. Jeffrey Karp's study of a 1991 Washington term limits initiative
showed that voters who were favorably disposed toward House Speaker
Tom Foley and who knew that he opposed the measure were far more
likely to oppose the measure themselves.4 5 James Gregg found that the
electorate follows newspapers' endorsements more than 80 percent of the
time,46 and David Magleby determined that the positions of groups such as
environmentalists and unions have a good deal of influence on voters'
behavior (greater, in fact, than politicians' stances).47 Finally, some
scholars contend that the framing of an initiative is critically important.
David McCuan et al. interviewed political consultants and found that, in
the consultants' view, the most important element of initiative campaigns
was the "drafting of messages designed to gain support or test likely
Magleby, similarly, analyzed several
objections for a ballot measure.' '
California initiatives and concluded that "[t]he battle over defining the
politics...
proposition is one of the most important aspects of ' initiative
9
[T]he side that defines the issue will win the election. A
In addition to these factors, two variables that are not emphasized in the
secondary literature should be cited. First, the positions adopted by the
major parties, and the intensity and consistency with which they are
44 Andrew Skalaban, The Mostly Sovereign People: Sophisticated Voting and Public Opinion
About Term Limits in California,20 POL. BEHAV. 35, 47 (1998).
45Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149, 162 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998)

[hereinafter CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS].
46MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 151 (citing the Gregg study); see also EDWARD C. BANFIELD &
JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 324 (1963) ("Where voters must.., pass on a multitude of referenda
issues, the newspaper acquires added influence."). Contra John E. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions:
Ballot Patterns andHistorical Trends in California,63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1197, 1211 (1969) ("This
analysis of ballots has found little evidence to support the view that newspaper recommendations
strongly affect the vote on the propositions.").
47MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 158-59; see also Thomas A. Henderson & Walter A. Rosenbaum,
Prospectsfor Consolidating Local Government: The Role of Elites in Electoral Outcomes, 17 Am.J.
Pol. Sci. 695, 717 (1973) ("The differing referendum outcomes [in two Florida referendums on local
government consolidation] were associated with contrasting elite attitudes and behaviors in the
campaigns.").
48 David McCuan et al., California's Political Warriors: CampaignProfessionalsand the Initiative

Process,in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 45, at 55, 68.
49MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 168-69; see also Mueller, supra note 46,at 1211 ("[C]ampaigning.
").
does seem to structure opinion on those few propositions on which it is conducted ....
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promoted, may have an impact on an initiative's odds of passing. 50 Parties
have significant resources, they can easily convey their message through
the politicians who belong to the party, and voters tend to respond to
partisan cues. When a party strongly supports or opposes a measure, its
stance should be expected to have some effect on the initiative's fate.
Second, major state and national developments may make a redistricting
initiative more or less likely to pass. A recent egregious gerrymander or a
nationwide tide in favor of electoral reform, for instance, may create a
favorable climate for a redistricting initiative. On the other hand, when
voters are relatively satisfied with the political status quo, they may be
reluctant to try to fix what does not seem to be broken.
B. Cases

The factors that one might expect, on the basis of the secondary
literature and common sense, to influence a redistricting initiative's
likelihood of passing are therefore the following: campaign spending; the
initiative's actual content and voters' evaluation of its benefits and costs;
the positions taken by newspapers, politicians, interest groups, and political
parties; the framing of the initiative over the course of the campaign; and
the presence or absence of important state or national developments. This
5
Section takes these factors into account while describing the twelve 1
redistricting initiatives and evaluating why they each succeeded or failed.

0 The typical view in the secondary literature is that parties do not often get involved in initiative
campaigns, and have little influence when they do get involved. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 67 (1989) ("The absence of
party labels [in initiative elections] . . . denies a majority of voters of a familiar cue."); MAGLEBY,
supra note 15, at 174 ("There are good reasons for political parties to avoid stands on ballot
measures."); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness
in DirectLegislation Elections, 17 POL. BEHAV. 287, 290 (1995) ("[P]artisan cues are usually absent [in
direct legislation elections]."); Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100
COLUM. L. REV. 731, 731 (2000) ("The conventional wisdom is that the initiative process weakens the
intermediary role of political parties.").
51 This Article does not consider the large number of initiatives that solely addressed
misapportionment, for instance by requiring all electoral districts to have approximately the same
population. The Article only considers initiatives that sought to create redistricting commissions and
thereby combat political gerrymandering. This choice as to scope was made because 1) the campaign
over an initiative is quite different when the measure seeks to create equally sized districts as opposed
to when it tries to take redistricting out of legislators' hands; and 2) more importantly, Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny have wholly mooted the debate over whether equally-sized
districts and one-person, one-vote are desirable. Pre-Baker initiatives are therefore examined only if
they tried to fight political gerrymandering in addition to legislative misapportionment.
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1. Arkansas, 1936 (Succeeded)
The first ever redistricting initiative took place in Arkansas in 1936.
The state legislature had long been badly misapportioned, with Assembly
and Senate districts varying widely in population,52 and no
reapportionment

having

taken

place

since

1890.13

In

response,

Amendment No. 23 was placed on the 1936 general election ballot. The
initiative sought to create a three-member Board of Apportionment to
conduct redistricting, composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and
the attorney general. The Board would have no power to change Assembly
district lines, which were required to correspond to county boundaries, but
would be able to vary the number of representatives that each county
received in accordance with its population.54 The Board would actually
have the authority to draw the thirty-five Senate districts, with the caveats
that counties could not be divided for any reason, non-contiguous counties
could not be combined, and all districts were required to have "as nearly as
practicable" the same population.
The campaign over Amendment No. 23 was quite subdued, as the 1936
presidential race and other ballot initiatives absorbed most of the attention
of Arkansas's politicians and media. Democratic Governor Junius Futrell
made no public statements about the reapportionment initiative, nor did the
state's legislators hold rallies or raise money for or against the measure.
Newspaper coverage was also scant but largely supportive, with both the
Arkansas Gazette" and the Arkansas Democrat 6 strongly endorsing the
measure.
In one typical editorial, the Gazette declared that
"[a]pportionment is not a matter of one county or senatorial district or
section against another, but a matter of fairness and justice for every
resident of Arkansas wherever he lives.' 57

52See A FairDealfor Every County, ARK. GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1936, at 1 [hereinafter A FairDeal]

("Where a certain county with 44,740 population has one representative, two counties with a combined
population of 43,262 have two representatives each, giving them together four times as many votes in
the House of Representatives."); Inequality and Injustice, ARK. GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1936, at I ("The
most glaring inequality of all is that imposed on one three-county district with 126,918 population and
one senator, as compared with another three-county district whose population is 33,225.").
See In Tuesday's Election, ARK. GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1936, at 1.
54 All of Arkansas's seventy-five counties are entitled to at least one Assembly representative.
53

Since the Assembly has one hundred seats, the Board has only twenty-five seats to distribute on the
basis of county population.
55 See A Fair Deal, supra note 52 ("Each county should of course have as many members as its
population entitles it to have .... Vote "For" Amendment No. [23].")
56 See Amendment No. 25-Apportionment, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Oct. 30, 1936, at 10 ("In the spirit of
everyday fairness to each other the voters should support Amendment No. [23].").
57 See Fairnessand Justicefor All, ARK. GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 1936, at 1.
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On November 3, 1936, Amendment No. 23 passed by a vote of 66
percent for versus 34 percent against. The main reason for the measure's
success appears to have been a desire by the electorate-sharpened by
favorable newspaper editorials-to undo the legislature's longstanding
misapportionment. In the absence of organized opposition, the policy
arguments against imbalances in legislative representation prevailed.
Decisions by Arkansas courts after the initiative's passage confirm this
assessment of why Amendment No. 23 succeeded. In the 1941 case of
Bailey v. Abington, the Arkansas Supreme Court opined that "by the
adoption of Amendment No. 23, the people intended to correct certain
evils that then existed," namely the situation where "some counties with a
small population [had] more representatives than others with a larger
population. 58 In Stevens v. Faubus, similarly, the Court stated that "[i]t
was because the allocation [of legislators] had not been changed for many
years and had become inequitable that the voters declared in Amendment
23 that the apportionment must be adjusted every ten years. 5 9
Importantly, partisan politics do not appear to have played a role in the
initiative campaign. Arkansas's Democratic Party retained firm control of
the state legislature both before and after Amendment No. 23 passed, and
no one could have expected the initiative to challenge the party's
predominance in a state that since Reconstruction had been one of the
country's least hospitable terrains for Republicans.
2. Oklahoma, 1960 (Failed)
Prior to 1960, the Oklahoma state legislature was one of the most
misapportioned in the country. An observer in the Western Political
Quarterly noted that "[d]espite a continuing urbanization, the Oklahoma
legislature remains ridiculously overpopulated with rural representatives,"
with 27 percent of voters controlling a majority of the lower chamber's
seats and 25 percent controlling a majority of the state senate. 60 The state
senator from Marshall and Love Counties represented only 15,879 persons

8 Bailey v. Abington, 148 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ark. 1941).
9 Stevens v. Faubus, 354 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Ark. 1962); see also Butler v. Democrat State Comm.,
160 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ark. 1942) ("The purpose of the amendment was, of course, to secure equal and
fair representation in the General Assembly upon the basis of proportionate population.").
60 Walter F. Scheffer, Problems in Municipal Finance, 15 W. POL. Q. 522, 525 (1962); see also

George B. Merry, Gerrymandering Lingers Across U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13, 1959, at
10 (noting that, in the 1958 congressional election, the Oklahoma Republican Party won just one of six
seats despite receiving 31 percent of the vote).
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while the senator from Tulsa County represented 248,000.61 Moreover,
this misapportionment existed in direct violation of the Oklahoma state
constitution, which required districts of roughly equal population and
reapportionment after each census.62
The Oklahoma House of
Representatives had last been reapportioned in 1920, and the Oklahoma
Senate had never been reapportioned in the state's entire history.6 3
In 1960, both the state's young Democratic governor, J. Howard
Edmondson, and the League of Women Voters, a national good
government group, supported an initiative that would have entrusted
reapportionment to a three-member Legislative Apportionment
Commission. The commission, composed of the attorney general, the
secretary of state, and the treasurer, would have drawn state electoral
districts of about the same population every ten years (with the caveat that
every county, no matter how small, would have been entitled to at least one
representative in the lower chamber). 64 Governor Edmondson backed the
measure out of frustration with the rurally dominated legislature, which
had refused to enact several policies that he favored. He campaigned hard
for redistricting reform, organizing a fifty-two member committee to rally
public opinion around the state, 65 and delivering frequent speeches about
the merits of the proposal and the danger that federal courts would
intervene if Oklahomans did not address their legislature's
misapportionment. 66 He was joined in support of the measure by major
61

Jim Young, Reapportionment Poses One of State's Stormiest Problems, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,

Apr. 3, 1960, at 83.
62 See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (repealed 1964) (distributing House seats to counties based in
part on their population and requiring reapportionment every ten years); id. art. V, § 9 (repealed 1964)
(same for Senate); see also James E. Clayton, State Apportionment Pressure Mounts, WASH. POST,
TIMES HERALD, Apr. 27, 1962, at Al ("Under Oklahoma's constitution, its two largest counties are
entitled to 15 of the 44 State Senators. They have three.").
63 See Jim Young, Edmondson Reapportion Plan Lifts
Ceiling, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11,
1960, at 68.
64See id.The League of Women Voters, while supportive of the initiative, would have preferred a
plan that strictly observed the principle of one-person, one-vote. See Apportion Petition Decision
Looming, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 21, 1959, at 3 ("[S]ome of the league members thought [the
governor's] proposal was watered-down .... "); Women Voters Keep Their Plan on Shelf DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 1960, at 27 ("League leaders objected to the governor's plan to assure every
county in the state at least one house member.").
65 See Jim Reid, Forces Massing in Petition Fight, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 5, 1960, at 5; see
also Fate of Reform Issue Depends on Voting Size, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 18, 1960, at 1 ("[T]he
Edmondson forces are putting on a drive for personal contact with voters to get them to the polls.").
66 See Federal Act Eyed in Apportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 1960, at 68 (quoting
Gov. Edmondson) ("[l]f we don't take this action it is a grave probability that the federal government
will do it for us .... It is a fair assumption that unless we act and exercise our own rights we might
well forfeit them."); Young, supra note 63 ("Edmondson contends his petitions will simply give 'fair
representation to all of the people no matter what county they live in."').
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newspapers, city governments, civic groups such as the League of
Women Voters, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the Tulsa
Jaycees, 69 and the Oklahoma Republican Party, which was one of the main
victims of misapportionment. 7°
Ironically, opposition came almost entirely from within the governor's
own party. Oklahoma Democrats, recognizing that redistricting reform
would weaken their grip on the state legislature, launched a furious
campaign against the initiative.
They formed a new organization,
Oklahomans for Local Government, to oppose the reapportionment
measure as well as two other ballot proposals that threatened rural
interests.7 '
They argued that the state should retain its existing
constitutional reapportionment formula, rather than amend it so that there
would be no cap on the number of seats a county could have.72 They
claimed that the initiative would allow a small number of urban counties to
dominate the state legislature and pass whatever laws they wished. 73 Most
importantly, they systematically rallied rural voters through vigorous
rhetoric, frequent campaign events,74 and an organization extending all the
way to the precinct level.75
In the end, the reapportionment initiative was defeated handily, by a
vote of 35 percent in favor versus 65 percent against. Only three of
Oklahoma's seventy-seven counties supported the measure, while "[t]he
one-sided majorities" in many rural counties "were the most lop-sided ever
67See infra note 72.

68See Council Backs Reapportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 14, 1960, at 4 (reporting that
the Oklahoma City Council passed a resolution in support of the reapportionment initiative, but only by
a 5-3 vote).
69 See Otis Sullivant, Unity Is Sought on Legislative Apportion Plan, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 4,
1959, at 1.

70See Harris Urges GOP Supportfor Petitions, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at 17.
71See Democrat Chiefs Fight Measures, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 11. Other groups
opposing the initiative-for example, the Rural Electrification Commission, the Farmers Union and
Farm Bureau, the Cattlemen's Association, and the County Officers Association-were also affiliated
with the state Democratic Party and rural interests.
72The irony of Oklahoma Democrats defending the constitutional formula after failing to apply it
for forty years in the lower chamber's case and ever in the senate's case was pointed out by Daily
Oklahoman editorials. See All the People All the Time, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 1960, at 10; What
the Constitution Says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 7, 1960, at 8 ("Actually the politicians who are
hollering about the virtues of the constitutional formula have no desire whatever to see it or any other
reapportionment proposal applied. What they really favor is the undisturbed status quo .... ").
73See Anything But the Facts, Ma'am, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 14 ("The voters are
being told that 'three or four heavily populated counties' will have enough legislative strength to pass
any laws they please if reapportionment passes September 20.").
74See Ray Parr, Governor Assailed at PetitionsRally, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at I
(describing a rally at Tishomingo where former governor Raymond Gary denounced the
reapportionment initiative).
71See Reid, supra note 65.
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given in the state on major issues. ' 76 The most important factor in the
initiative's defeat was the intensity of opposition among the state
Democratic Party and its rural backers, who rightly feared that their
political clout would be diminished if the initiative passed. Turnout was
extremely high-and voter sentiment almost uniformly negative-in rural
counties, while city dwellers turned out in smaller numbers and supported
the initiative by less impressive majorities. 77 As the Daily Oklahoman
remarked, "[r]ural voters were fanatically determined to protect what they
considered their interests," while "[u]rban voters were only indifferently
responsive to theirs. 78 Oklahoma Democrats also seem to have framed
the issues in the election more effectively than Governor Edmondson.
While the governor spoke about fairness in political representation, a
relatively abstract concern, state Democrats told rural voters that their
power would be undercut if the initiative passed, that the state constitution
would be amended in a manner contrary to the intentions of the
document's framers, and that state politics would come to be dominated by
big city interests.
3. Oklahoma, 1962 (Succeeded)
Two years later, Oklahoma's reformers tried again. The initiative they
proposed this time differed subtly from the measure that failed in 1960, in
that the 1962 initiative did not seek to change the constitutional
reapportionment formula, only to enforce it by means of a commission.79
Counties would thus not be entitled to at least one representative in the
lower chamber, nor would the cap on country representation in the lower
chamber (seven) be eliminated, if the initiative passed. 80 As in 1960,
Governor Edmondson backed the measure, as did the state Republican
Party 81 and Oklahoma's leading newspaper. 82 In addition, both parties'
76Otis Sullivant, State Votes No, No, No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 1;see also Rural

Vote Emphatically No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 27 ("Never before in the history of
elections [have] such one-sided majorities been rolled up in the rural areas. In Cimarron County, in the
far end of the Panhandle," the vote was "1,240 votes against to a mere 5 for reapportionment.").
77See Rift in Oklahoma Hurts Democrats,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1960, at 55 ("Rural voters turned
out in record numbers to swamp the proposals. They were favored in the larger cities, but the majorities
there were not so large as expected and the vote was much lighter than in the rural areas.").
78 Where There Is Light, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 22, 1960, at 18.
79The proposed Constitutional Apportionment Commission would also have been composed of the
attorney general, the secretary of state, and the treasurer.
80 See In re Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, 373 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1962)
(holding that the 1962 initiative is "substantially different" from the 1960 initiative, and therefore not
barred from the ballot by a constitutional provision prohibiting the resubmission of an initiative within
three years of its initial defeat).
81See Apportion Drive To Get GOPAid, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 6, 1961, at 10.
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candidates for governor expressed their support for the initiative,83 and a
new group called Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment spearheaded
the signature-gathering process.84
More importantly, the judicial landscape had shifted between 1960 and
1962.

In March 1962, the Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr85 that

legislative apportionment presented a justiciable question and that electoral
districts were required to have approximately the same population. That
decision sparked widespread litigation and legislation, and galvanized
supporters of redistricting reform across the country. 86 In Oklahoma, a
federal district court applied Baker to the apportionment of the state's
legislature, and concluded that the entire arrangement was
unconstitutional.87 The court gave the Oklahoma legislature until March 8,
1963 to come up with an electoral regime that did not violate the
Constitution and threatened to reapportion the legislature itself if the
deadline was not met.88

The 1962 initiative campaign, therefore, was

conducted under the looming cloud of federal judicial intervention.
Because of this cloud, the tone of the campaign on both sides was
muted by comparison to the feisty 1960 confrontation. Both parties'
nominees for governor rarely discussed reapportionment and said they
would defer to the voters' judgment.89
Oklahomans for Local
Government, the group that led the opposition to the 1960 initiative, did
82

See At Long Last, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 5, 1962, at 28 (endorsing the reapportionment

initiative).
83 See Governor Foes To Let Voters Decide Issue, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 29, 1962, at 3
[hereinafter Governor Foes] ("Both candidates early in the campaign had declared for constitutional
apportionment as a general proposition, and each said he would call a special election on the measure if
he became governor .... "). Governor Edmondson was unable to run for reelection because of term
limits.
8 See William Beecher, Political Upheaval? Cities To Gain Power if High Court's Ruling Spurs
Reapportionment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1962, at 1; see also Apportion Backers Plan Intensive Drive,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 7, 1962, at 11 ("Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment announced
Saturday an intensive and active campaign to insure success in the November 6 election.").
85 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
86See Alan L. Otten, Rural Lawmakers: Rapid Reapportionment Threatens Their Hold on State
Legislatures, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1962, at 1 ("With a speed and scope defying all forecasts, the
Supreme Court's landmark reapportionment decision is revolutionizing the makeup of state
legislatures."); Layhmond Robinson, 22 States Battle on Redistricting: Fight Spurred by High Court
Ruling Is SpreadingFast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 23 ("The politically potent issue of legislative
apportionment is burning like a prairie fire across the nation. Only a small flame in a few states some
months ago, the issue has blazed to new prominence following a landmark decision by the United
States Supreme Court .... ").
87See Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (D. Okla. 1962).
88Id.; see also CourtAccepts Oklahoma Promise,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1962, at 11.
'9 See Governor Foes, supra note 833 ("The nominees for governor are willing to let the voters
make their own decision on the initiative measure for constitutional reapportionment of the
legislature.").
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not organize against the 1962 measure. 90 Overall, the initiative generally

was "not an issue that worked up the people as the contesting forces did on
Gov. Edmondson's reform program, which included reapportionment, in
1960. ' '1
In the wake of this subdued campaign, the initiative passed by a margin

of 55 percent for to 45 percent against.92 The Supreme Court's decision in
Baker and the Oklahoma district court's ultimatum to the state legislature

were unquestionably the most important factors explaining the initiative's
victory.

In 1960, Oklahoma's rural voters had believed that they could

prevent reapportionment, and so had turned out in large numbers to
preserve their political influence. By 1962, it was clear that, one way or
another, reapportionment was going to take place. Either the legislature
would act on its own, or a popular initiative would pass, or a federal court
would intercede on behalf of the principle of one-person, one-vote. The

incentive to fight reapportionment tooth and nail no longer existed, and the
93
1962 initiative accordingly skulked its way to victory.

4. North Dakota, 1973 (Failed)
North Dakota's 1973 redistricting initiative, like the Oklahoma measure

eleven years earlier, arose in the context of litigation involving the oneperson, one-vote principle.
In the 1960s, courts thrice invalidated
reapportionment plans drawn by the North Dakota state legislature. 94 The
North Dakota district court eventually imposed its own plan in 1965, which

was notable for the multimember senate districts it created as well as the

90 See Otis Sullivant, Reapportionment Issue Fails to Stir up Election Interest, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 1962, at 5.

91Id.; see also Otis Sullivant, Apportion Issue To Increase Vote, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 26,
1962, at 3 ("[T]he initiative measure, if it gets on the ballot, will not be as hot an issue as it was two
years ago ....The rural areas will not be as excited because of the federal court decision ....).
92But this was not the end of the initiative's story. In Allen v. Burkhart, 377 P.2d 821, 825 (Okla.
1963), the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the initiative had actuallyfailed because "the aggregate
number of affirmative votes fell short of a majority of the total number of ballots cast throughout the
State in the general election." Later in 1963, after further legislative inaction, a federal district court
reapportioned the Oklahoma state legislature. See Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (D. Okla. 1963).
In a nice twist, the federal district court imposed the same reapportionment plan that the commission
created by the initiative had adopted before it was dissolved by the state supreme court in Allen. See id.
at 156.
93Also in the 1962 initiative's favor (though much less important than the judicial developments)
was that it defused the criticisms of supporters of the constitutional reapportionment formula. As noted
above, the 1960 initiative had proposed various changes to the constitutional reapportionment formula,
while the 1962 initiative left it undisturbed.
94See Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.D. 1964) [Paulson ];Paulson v. Meier, 246 F.
Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965) [Paulson11];
State ex rel. Lien v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962).
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relatively large inter-district population discrepancies that it authorized. 95
After the 1970 census, the state legislature failed to reapportion itself, and
the district court struck down the existing district map-ironically, the
same one that it had fashioned itself seven years earlier-and imposed yet
another plan for the 1972 election only.96 This plan also included
multimember districts and substantial inter-district population variance.
In 1973, the Republican-dominated North Dakota state legislature
finally passed a reapportionment plan calling for five multimember senate
districts and an inter-district population variance of 6.8 percent .97 The
governor, Democrat Arthur A. Link, vetoed the plan but had his veto
overridden by a vote of 72-30 in the House and 37-14 in the Senate.9 8
Supporters of the governor then filed a referendum petition subjecting the
legislature's plan to a statewide vote, and also launched an initiative to take
redistricting out of the legislature's hands altogether. The initiative would
have required all of North Dakota's legislative districts, for both the House
and Senate, to elect only one representative, and created a bipartisan ninemember commission to draw the district lines. 99
Not surprisingly, the chief backers of the initiative were Governor Link,
the state Democratic Party, and traditional Democratic allies such as
organized labor and farm organizations.'0 ° Democrats objected to both the
boundaries of many districts, which they contended were unduly favorable
to Republican candidates, and the multimember nature of some Senate and
all House districts. According to Democrats, the latter feature allowed
Republicans, who were the majority party in most of the multimember
districts, to win far more seats than they deserved given their popular
support. As the Bismarck Tribune observed, "[i]n a state which elected a
Democratic governor and lieutenant governor as well as a state treasurer
and tax commissioner, voters only elected 10 Democrats to the 51-member
95See Paulson Hi.
The plan created five multimember senate districts, and managed to have only
twenty-five of thirty-nine districts within 5 percent of the average district population. NORTH DAKOTA
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING - BACKGROUND

MEMORANDUM

4 (2000),

available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/ assembly/56-1999/interim-info/docs/19043.pdf.
96 See Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972) [Chapman I].
97

NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 95, at 5.

98See Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 387 (D.N.D. 1974) [ChapmanI1].
99 The House and Senate minority and majority leaders would each have appointed two
commission members, and those eight members would then have elected the ninth member, who would
have doubled as the commission's chairperson. See Average Voter Little Concerned with Special
Election Issues, FARGO FORUM, Oct. 28, 1973, at C4 [hereinafter Average Voter] ("The constitutional
amendment is a virtual creation of Democratic Gov. Arthur A. Link and the referred measure is
[subjected] to a vote of the people largely through the efforts and with the support of the Democratic
party."); Bill Tillottson, N.D. Voters May Decide Remap Issue, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 23, 1973, at 1.
100Id.
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Senate and 22 Democrats to the 102-member House."' 0 ' The initiative's
supporters' other important argument was that single-member districts
would improve representatives' accountability to their constituents. In
Lieutenant Governor Wayne Sanstead's words, "[s]ingle-member districts
would create lines that would make candidates for public office come from
one particular area. They would be voted on by a smaller number of
people,01 2 thus making government more responsive to the needs of that
area."

Opposition to the initiative was concentrated in North Dakota's
Republican Party, which stood to lose influence if the measure passed.
Republicans attacked the initiative on multiple grounds. The state party's
chairman, Allan C. Young, declared repeatedly that the redistricting
commission would amount to "yet another bureaucracy that would be
completely unresponsive to the people of North Dakota."'0 3 Other
prominent Republicans claimed that the creation of single-member House
and Senate districts would disrupt existing political communities and dilute
rural influence in the state legislature.' 0 4 Also leveled at the initiative were
charges that it was merely an effort by frustrated Democrats to seize a
greater share of the political spoils, 10 5 that a new state census would be
required if the measure passed, 10 6 that the initiative "assumes that there will
never be more than two parties or two factions in the legislative arena,"' 7
and that decennial redistricting might be too inflexible for a state as
'01Bill Tillottson, Amendment Backers Seek i-Solon Units, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 26, 1973, at 32.
102Remap Plan Gets Support of Sanstead, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov, 9, 1973, at 5; see also Tillottson,

supra note 101 (paraphrasing Alton Schuette, chairman of the pro-initiative Committee for Equal
Apportionment) ("If those multi-districts could be broken up . . . with legislators more closely
representing their constituents and with each voter having to concentrate on electing only one senator
and one representative on what would be a neighborhood basis, equality would be achieved.").
103Phil Matthews, ConstitutionalAmendment Draws Election Spotlight, FARGO F., Oct. 29, 1973,
at 3; see also Spokesmen Trade Views on Reapportionment Vote, BISMARCK TRtB., Nov. 16, 1973, at 7
(also quoting Young) ("'I believe the people of North Dakota will reject the creation of yet another
bureaucracy . .. with unlimited spending power and with responsibility to neither the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of government or to the people.').
104See Litten Calls Remap Vote 'Gerrymandering' Plan, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 19, 1973, at 3
(quoting State Senator C. Warner Litten) ("'When you start trying to break up the cities of Fargo,
Grand Forks and Minot into single Senate and single House districts, you will have a real
gerrymandering hodge-podge."'); Bill Tillottson, Voter Confusion Problem for Amendment's Foes,
BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 27, 1973, at 20 (State Senator David E. Nething "argues that the proposal,
which also creates House subdistricts would break up rural voting patterns with a net result in
weakening rural influence in the legislature.").
105See Average Voter, supra note 99 ("Of course, if the Democrats had the majority, we could well
imagine there would be little support from them for the proposed amendment."); Tillottson, supra note
104 ("Democrats have been unable to get into the legislature in greater numbers, [State Senator Myron
H.] Atkinson said, so they have tried to change the procedures for electing lawmakers.").
106See 'Amendment OK Means Census,'BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 24, 1973, at 3.
107Average Voter, supra note 100.
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dynamic as North Dakota. 10 8 Many of these charges were echoed by the
state's two most important newspapers, the Bismarck Tribune and the
FargoForum, both of which opposed the initiative.' 0 9
On December 4, 1973, the initiative went down to defeat with 45
percent of the vote in favor compared to 55 percent against. (The
referendum on the legislature's reapportionment plan also failed by a 53
percent to 47 percent margin.). The unified opposition of North Dakota's
majority party and media establishment was a key factor in the measure's
loss at the polls. The initiative's critics also made more (though not
necessarily better) arguments than its supporters, and received more
attentive press coverage." ° Furthermore, Governor Link, the most
important Democrat in the state, barely involved himself in the
campaign."' Finally, voter turnout in the election-in which the only
items on the ballot were the redistricting initiative and the reapportionment
referendum-was exceptionally light, a situation that typically favors the
proponents of the status quo.l 2
5. Colorado, 1974 (Succeeded)
Reapportionment consumed much of the Colorado state legislature's
calendar in 1972. Legislators took months to come up with their initial
plan, 1 3 only to see it struck down by the Colorado Supreme Court for
violating the state constitution's district compactness requirement.' 14 The
legislature's next map was upheld in litigation," l5 but attracted attention
because of the oddly shaped districts that it created. One district,
according to Representative Jerry Kopel, "looked like an equatorial line on
a world globe dividing the city, with portions of the boundaries through
108
See Should We Lock Ourselves in?, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 28, 1973, at 4.
'9 See Average Voter, supra note 100 (expressing the Fargo Forum's opposition to the initiative);
Cure Worse Than the Il, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 1, 1973, at 4 (same for the Bismarck Tribune).
110These claims are based on my reading all initiative-related pieces in the Fargo Forum and

Bismarck Tribune.
1I found only one newspaper article quoting Governor Link about the initiative. See No New
Census Neededfor Remap, Link Says, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 30, 1973, at 3.
112 See

Bill Tillottson, Light Voter Turnout Seen, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 3, 1973, at 1; id (quoting

State Senator Nething) ("I think all the publicity has confused voters more than helped them make up
their minds ....Confusion usually leads to a 'No' vote.").
113See Amendment No. 9: Yes, DENVER POST, Oct. 22, 1974, at 22 [hereinafter Yes on 9] ("Anyone
who recalls the 1972 legislative session can affirm that legislative leaders-as well as their rank-andfile 'troops'-were tied up for many weeks trying to redistrict the state .... ");Bob Ewegen,
Reapportion Plan on Ballot, DENVER POST, Oct. 14, 1974, at 3 ("The Colorado Legislature ... was
snarled for months in 1972 as it tried to reapportion itself ....
114See Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1972).
115See In re Interrogatories by the General Assembly as Propounded by House Resolution No.
1020, 497 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1972).
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city parks just several yards wide."'1 16 That district was nicknamed the
"Bettymander" because it was designed to weaken Representative Betty
Benevidez's hold on her seat.' 17
In the wake of this controversial redistricting exercise, Colorado's
League of Women Voters proposed an initiative that would delegate
district-drawing responsibilities to an eleven-member commission. The
commission would include the majority and minority leaders of both state
legislative chambers, three members appointed by the governor, and four
members appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court."'
It would redistrict the state legislature every ten years, and craft districts
that were compact, that preserved communities of interest, and that
1
deviated less than 5 percent in their population. 19
The debate over the Colorado initiative was placid by comparison to the
firestorms that enveloped similar measures in other states, both before and
after 1974. Good government groups such as the League of Women
Voters and Common Cause supported the initiative, but their main
argument on behalf of the measure was just that it would allow the state
legislature to focus on more important issues. 20 They did not denounce
the Republican Party for its 1972 gerrymander or emphasize the inherent
unseemliness of legislative redistricting. Colorado's main newspapers also
devoted relatively little coverage to the initiative and expressed their
(conflicting) editorial positions in moderate language.' 2 1
Most
surprisingly, the state's parties and prominent politicians were almost
entirely silent about the initiative. No new organizations were formed to
fight for or against the measure, and I did not find a single newspaper
116 Jerry Kopel - Reapportionment, http://www.jerrykopel.com/b/Reapportionment-2001.htm

(last

visited Oct. 15, 2007).
117id.

'18 In addition, no more than six of the eleven commissioners could come from the same political
party, each Colorado congressional district had to have at least one commission member, and one
member had to live west of the Continental Divide.
19 See Ewegen, supra note 1133.
120 See Proposal 9 Backed by Common Cause, DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 1974, at 2 ("In urging a

'yes' vote on the amendment, Common Cause pointed to what it called the 'long, haggling sessions' by
legislators 'struggling to retain their own seats.' The result is to waylay critical issues 'no matter which

party is in the majority."').
121

See Vote No on Amendment Nine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 25, 1974, at 68 [hereinafter

No on 9] ("[W]e don't believe this constitutional duty should be taken away from the Legislature.");
Yes on 9, supra note 1133 ("[T]his newspaper believes that the reapportionment commission can be a
forward step."). The Rocky Mountain News's main arguments against the initiative were that it
"dislike[d] the trend in government of appointing people to various boards, commissions and
government positions," and that it would be difficult for the Colorado Supreme Court to evaluate fairly
a map produced by a commission four members of which were appointed by the court's chief justice.
See No on 9, supra.
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article quoting the governor or any major legislative figure about the
initiative. In fact, the only reference to politicians' views on the initiative
that I was able to find came two days before the election, and merely cited
unnamed legislators who had "come out in opposition to Amendment 9,
insisting that redistricting is a job done best by lawmakers, using the giveand-take of the legislative process.' 22
The explanation for the campaign's strange calm-and for the
initiative's resounding 60 percent to 40 percent victory on election day-is
that 1974 was not a normal year in the annals of American politics. It was,
rather, the year of Watergate and of President Nixon's resignation, and one
of the best years ever for Democrats across the country. In Colorado,
Democrats defeated an incumbent Republican governor, U.S. senator, state
attorney general, and state treasurer, while also winning control of the
General Assembly. 23 The election's dramatic pro-Democratic tilt reduced
both parties' incentives to talk much about the initiative. Republicans,
sensing imminent electoral catastrophe, were reluctant to criticize a
measure that was leading in the polls, 124 and unable to make the argument

that the initiative was an effort by sore loser Democrats to seize more
political power. Democrats, on the other hand, did not need to lobby hard
for a measure that was already almost sure to pass, and were more focused
on the many contested candidate elections in 1974 than the initiative
campaign. In the end, Amendment 9 cruised easily to victory atop the
year's pro-Democratic and pro-reform tidal wave, escaping almost
unscathed from the attacks that typically befall redistricting initiatives.
6. Ohio, 1981 (Failed)
Ohio already had a redistricting commission in place in 1981. Fourteen
years earlier, the state legislature had passed (and Ohio's voters had
ratified) a constitutional amendment transferring redistricting authority for
state elections to a five-member Apportionment Board. 125 In the early

122 Suzanne Weiss,

10 Constitutional Amendments and Referred Laws on Ballot, ROCKY

MOUNTAIN NEWs, Nov. 3, 1974, at Trend 3.
123See Leroy F. Aarons, Colorado Tide Not One of Liberalism, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1974, at AI

achieved hurricane force last
("There is a strange wind blowing in the Colorado Rockies ....[It]
November and turned into a disaster for Colorado Republicans.").
124See Bob Ewegen, 9 Proposals Firm, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 1974, at 15 (noting that the
redistricting initiative enjoyed a thirteen-point lead in October 1974, virtually unchanged from its
eighteen-point lead the previous month).
125
See
History
of
Ohio
Redistricting,
http://www.researchfortherestofus.org/SafeSeatsDangerousDemocracy/history.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2007). The Board is made up of the governor, the auditor, the secretary of state, and two members
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1980s, however, Republicans were dissatisfied with the Board because
Democrats enjoyed a three-to-two advantage on it, and had twice used that
advantage to enact pro-Democratic redistricting plans.1 26 Accordingly, the
Ohio Republican Party proposed a measure that would have replaced the
existing Board with a bipartisan commission made up of two Democrats,
two Republicans, and a fifth member chosen by the four partisan
appointees. The new commission would not actually have drafted district
maps itself, but rather would have adopted the state and federal plans
compact, as measured by the
submitted to it in which districts were most
12 7
perimeter.
their
to
area
districts'
of
ratio
Ohio Republicans and good government groups were the initiative's
main backers. Republican Party state chairman Earl Barnes declared that
"[r]egardless of whether it's Republican or Democratic, I think the people
are getting damned tired of gerrymandering.' ' 128 John Evans, the
coordinator of the pro-initiative campaign, termed the proposal
"innovative" and stated that "[b]etter government through fair and
impartial redistricting is our goal.' ' 129 Republicans were joined in support
of the measure by the League of Women Voters and the Ohio Council of
Churches. 130 Together, they created a new organization, the Committee for
Fair and Impartial Redistricting, and spent in the vicinity of $750,000
collecting signatures 3 ' and $600,000 "on a media campaign aimed at
discrediting the political methods currently used for apportioning
districts."' 32
In opposition, Ohio Democrats accused the initiative's backers of
attempting to seize political influence that they had been unable to win at
the ballot box. James Leahy, executive director of the state Democratic
Party, scoffed that "[i]f they don't like the game, they try to change the

appointed by legislative leaders. The Board draws House and Senate districts on the basis of equal
population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for existing political boundaries.
126See Adam Clymer, Ohio G.O.P. Asks Redistricting Aided by Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1981, at A13 (quoting Ohio Republican Party chairman Earl Barnes) ("I'm not saying that if we had
control of the Apportionment Board, we'd be pushing [the initiative] at this time."); id.("As they did
after the 1970 census, the Democrats now hold a three-to-two majority on the Apportionment Board...
). However, neither the 1970 nor the 1980 reapportionments in Ohio were especially flawed.
127See id. Districts would also have had to vary by no more than 3 percent from the average district
population.
128Id.
129See George B. Merry, Redistricting by Computer: Some PoliticiansWorry They 7lLose Control,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Apr. 27, 1981, at 10.

130See Clymer, supranote 126.
131See id.

132See United Press International Release, Nov. 4, 1981.
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rules." 133 Another Democratic official, noting that Ohio had adopted its
present Apportionment Board just fourteen years before and that
Republicans had also tried and failed to place a similar initiative on the
1980 ballot, commented that "I'm not sure how many times you can build
the ark, especially if it don't flood.' 34 Democrats also cited the likely
consequences of the initiative as evidence that it was nothing but a
Republican power grab; "the plan could insure that both of Ohio's lost
Representatives [after the 1980 census] would be Democrats. If the
initiative fails and the politically divided Legislature does the job, each
party would lose one safe seat."' 135 Finally, Democrats attacked the
initiative's supporters for raising most of their funds from large
corporations, and threatened those corporations with a36reduction in their
political influence if they continued their contributions. 1
On election day, Issue 2 lost with 42 percent of the vote for versus 58
percent against-a somewhat surprising result given that Republicans
controlled the state's governorship as well as one of the two legislative
chambers. The main explanation for the initiative's defeat was probably
the relatively tepid support that it received from the state Republican Party,
compared to Democrats' energetic opposition. 37 Governor James Rhodes
was almost entirely silent on the subject of the initiative.' 38 More
importantly, Ohio's Republican legislators were quite uneasy about Issue
2, which would have required the redistricting commission automatically
to adopt the state and federal plans with the most compact districts.
Compactness may be a virtue when all else is equal, but its elevation above
all other redistricting considerations-such as respect for communities of
133 See

Clymer, supra note 1266; see also William Carlson, Issue 2 Is Significant for Many

Ohioans, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 12, 1981, at 20-A ("Democrats charge that the incumbent
Republican or any subsequent governor would provide a political edge in all but the most isolated
counties" because of a provision authorizing the governor to divide municipalities with a population
greater than 5,000 into subunits for the purpose of district-drawing.); Joseph D. Rice, Rep. Stokes Leads
Big Fight Against Remap Issue, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 31, 1981, at 4-A (quoting black Ohio

congressman Louis Stokes) ("It would wipe out my congressional district. There is just no way I could
survive.").
134
See Clymer, supra note 126.
135See Adam Clymer, States Lag on RedistrictingforCongress,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1981, at B 13.
136See William Carlson, CorporateEthics on Issue 2 Criticized,PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),

Oct.

27, 1981, at 13-A; Joseph D. Rice & William Carlson, Dems Get Revenge on Issue 2 Backers, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 25, 1981, at 1-A.
137
See United Press International Release, Nov. 4, 1981 ("An elated C. Paul Tipps, chairman of the
Ohio Democratic Party, said he believed a strong turnout across the state helped seal the defeat of Issue
2."). 138
See Joseph D. Rice, Rhodes Likely To Say He's for
State Issue 2, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Oct. 28, 1981, at I1-A (noting, a week before the election, that the governor had not yet announced his
position on the redistricting initiative, and that he had "publicly steered clear of the issue").
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interest and political boundaries, district continuity from one election to
a serious threat to all incumbent legislators, Democratic
another-posed 139
and Republican.
7. California,1982 (Failed)
The first of four California redistricting initiatives took place in 1982.
During the previous year's legislative session, Democrats had pushed
through a reapportionment plan that promised to strengthen substantially
their party's hold on both the state legislature and California's
congressional delegation. 140 Republicans, furious at what they considered
to be a blatant partisan gerrymander, initiated two direct democracy
campaigns to undo the legislature's handiwork. First, they obtained
enough petitions to subject the three reapportionment plans (for the
Assembly, the Senate, and the congressional delegation) to a statewide
referendum. The referendum occurred in June 1982, and resulted in the
three plans being rejected by an average margin of 63 percent to 37
percent. 141
Second, state Republicans joined forces with Common Cause to draft
and promote a redistricting initiative. The initiative would have created a
ten-member redistricting commission with four members appointed by the
Assembly and Senate party caucuses, two members appointed by the major
parties' chairmen, and four members appointed by senior state appellate
judges. The commission would have been required to draw state and
federal districts that were compact, respectful of political subdivisions, and
divergent by no more than 2 percent from the average district population.
Any reapportionment plan would have needed the approval of seven
commission members, including at least three of the court-appointed
commissioners and one of each party's appointees. If the commission

139Cf No on State Issue 2, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 23, 1981, at 12-B ("We have difficulty
accepting the idea that compactness... is the sole relevant criterion for forming districts .... ).
140 See Jerry Gillam & Claudia Luther, 2 Redistricting Bills Advance, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1981,

at I ("Democrats in the Legislature bulldozed down angry Republican opposition Friday night and
approved reapportionment plans aimed at strengthening Democratic domination of the state senate and
Californian seats in Congress for the next decade."); Claudia Luther & Jerry Gillam, 3 Plansfor State
Redistricting OKd, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1981, at B1 ("One Republican assemblyman likened the
Democrats' treatment of the GOP to the Holocaust of World War II while another accused Assembly
Speaker Willie L. Brown Jr . .. of killing off his political foes as does Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini.").
141
See
California
Propositions,
1982,
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/cgibin/starfinger/6199/calprop.txt (last visited Oct. 15, 2007); Bill Billiter & Ronald L. Soble, Voters
Strongly Reject Canal Back Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1982, at 1.
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deadlocked, the California Supreme1 42Court would have appointed special
masters to carry out the redistricting.
California Republicans were the 1982 initiative's most important
backers. They spent about $350,000 gathering signatures for the measure
and another $250,000 campaigning for it, 143 and also provided significant
financial supportfor a pro-initiative group called Citizens for Fair
Representation. 44 Joining the Republicans in support of the initiative were
an array of interest groups (e.g. Common Cause, the League of California
Cities, the California Chamber of Commerce, the American Association of
University Women, the California Church Council, the National
Association of Retired Persons, and the National Association of Retired
Teachers), as well as President Reagan and former President Ford.145 The
main arguments of the initiative's supporters were that a redistricting
commission was the only way to prevent the Democrats from repeating
their 1981 power grab, 146 and that legislators are intrinsically unable to
47
separate their personal interest from the public good during redistricting. 1
California's Democratic Party and Democratic Governor Jerry Brownthe architects of the 1981 reapportionment-were the initiative's principal
opponents.148 Interestingly, few interest groups joined the Democrats in
opposition, 49 though the Los Angeles Times did come out against the
initiative.' 50
Democrats spent about $250,000 campaigning against
redistricting reform,' 5' and made a wide assortment of claims about the
initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie Brown asserted that a redistricting
commission would be just as roiled by partisan strife as the state
142Claudia

Luther, New RedistrictingInitiative Submitted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1981, at B3.
Luther, Initiative To Create RedistrictingCommission Qualifiesfor Ballot, L.A. TIMES,
June 22, 1982, at B3.
144See Bill Billiter, Prop. 14: Election Reform or a Trojan Horse?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1982, at
El.
45Id.; see also Citizen Reagan Signs Petition on Remapping, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at A2.
146See Claudia Luther, GOP To Aid Remapping Reform Bid, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1981, at A3
("[E]ven if the referendums succeed, Democrats-who hold majorities in both houses-have the power
to enact similar reapportionment plans again. The most the referendums could accomplish is to keep
intact the current districts .... ").
147 See Michael Asimow & Walter Zeiman, Prop. 14: Is It Real 'Reform'?, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10,
1982, at E3 ("When it comes to drawing district lines and determining their own political fate, even the
most noble legislators place personal and public interests over the public interest ... ").
' See Billiter, supra note 144 ("By contrast, there is no coalition or separate campaign
organization for the opponents of Proposition 14. Almost all of the organized opposition comes from
the state Democratic Party .... ).
149 1 found only one newspaper article that described interest group opposition to redistricting
reform. See Claudia Luther, Remapping Challenge May Be Just Warm-Up, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1982,
at B3 (claiming that organized labor would help run the campaign against the June referenda).
150See Reapportionment: No on 14, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1982, at E4 [hereinafter No on 14].
151
See Luther, supra note 143.
143Claudia
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legislature, 52 and that commissions generally work no better than
legislative redistricting.'5 3 Assembly Democratic Caucus Leader Douglas
Bosco predicted that the commission would be composed of "a bunch of
old, white, upper-middle-class men," thus failing to reflect California's
diversity. 154 And other Democrats argued that the commission would lack
accountability to the public, 155 and that it would be prone to deadlock
1 56
because of its peculiar requirements for passing a reapportionment plan.
On November 2, 1982, the initiative was defeated by a vote of 45
percent for versus 55 percent against. The measure's backers actually
spent more money and received more support from third-party groups than
the initiative's opponents, meaning that the loud and persistent criticism by
the Democratic Party and Governor Brown was probably crucial to the
measure's loss at the polls. As was also the case in other initiatives, the
measure's opponents seem to have been more mobilized and more creative
in their arguments than proponents of redistricting reform, enabling
them
1 57
to prevail in the end despite their initially inauspicious position.
8. California, 1984 (Failed)
After the November 1982 redistricting initiative failed, the California
state legislature passed a new reapportionment plan similar to (and just as
pro-Democratic as) the one that had been rejected by the state's voters in
the June 1982 referendum. Angry Republicans responded by launching
another initiative, this one prescribing the actual district lines for state and
federal elections."' The initiative was scheduled for a December 1983
152

See Bill Billiter, Democrats Opposed to Remapping Plan Chided by Speaker, L.A. TIMES, Feb.

25, 1982, at B22. Governor Brown echoed this criticism. See Luther, supra note 142 (quoting Governor
Brown) ("[Y]ou can't really come up with a non-political or apolitical answer to a political problem-it
just isn't conceivable. Nobody is pure.").
153See Luther, supra note 146.
154Billiter, supra note 144; see also Luther, supra note 1433 (paraphrasing California Democratic
Party Chairwoman Nancy Pelosi) ("[T]he commission proposed in the initiative is structured so that it
is unlikely that minorities and women will be appointed to participate ... ").
'55See Claudia Luther & Richard Bergholz, CampaignLaunchedfor Remap Initiative, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1982, at B3; see also No on 14, supra note 150 ("A far more serious flaw in the initiative is that
the public could not hold an independent commission accountable for its work .... ).
156See Bruce Cain, No: What Is 'Fair'to Some Would Not Be to Others, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1982, at E3 ("Each party delegation will have the power to veto any final decision."); see also Billiter,
supra note 144 ("Critics of Proposition 14 contend that the state Supreme Court will wind up
reapportioning the state in virtually every case because at least one of the three members appointed by
each major party must give a vote before any plan can be approved.").
157See Billiter, supra note 1444 (citing a late August poll that showed a six-point lead for
Proposition 14).
158
See Richard Bergholz, GOP Assemblyman Announces Petition Drive To Get RedistrictingPlan
on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1983, at 22.
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vote, and both parties began preparing for what one Democrat described as
"the political fight of a generation." 159 However, the preparations were cut
short by the California Supreme Court, which ruled in September that the
initiative violated the state constitution because it would have
authorized
160
an impermissible second redistricting during a single decade.
Unfazed by the court's decision, California Republicans drafted yet
another redistricting initiative for the 1984 election. This initiative would
have created a redistricting commission made up of eight retired state
appellate judges, four appointed by Republican governors and four by
Democrats. 6 1 The commission would have formulated district maps on
the basis of competitiveness, compactness, contiguity, and equipopulation,
and then submitted the maps to the electorate for approval in a statewide
referendum. If the commission found itself deadlocked,62 one member
would have been eliminated at random to break the logjam. 1
The 1984 battle lines closely resembled those from two years earlier,
except that Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, had been replaced by
George Deukmejian, a Republican.
Governor Deukmejian led the
Republican effort in support of the initiative. According to one observer,
he "devoted virtually his full-time efforts for weeks and more than $1
million in his personal election funds to the campaign," 163 and repeated his
campaign theme, "fairness, not politics," at rally after rally.' 64 Republicans
spent $1.3 million to qualify the initiative for the ballot, and about $2

159 Kevin Roderick, 'Political Fight of Generation' Slated, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1983, at B3
(quoting California Democratic Party Chairman Peter Kelly); see also John Balzarl & Douglas Shuit,
Governor Orders Remapping Vote, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1983, at BI (reporting that Republicans were
prepared to spend $3-5 million supporting the initiative, and Democrats up to $5 million to oppose it);
Jerry Gillam & Carl Ingram, Democrats Push Hardfor 'Survival'Money, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1983, at
A3 (quoting Speaker Brown) ("This is the Super Bowl. [Republicans are] trying to take my seat in the
Assembly as well as my job as Speaker.").
'60 See Legislature of the State of California v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1983).
161 The eight commission members would have been chosen by lot by the president of the
University of California.
162 See Proposition 39, 1984, http:/traynor.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/621 l/calprop.txt (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007); Douglas Shuit, Deukmejian's Remap Plan Hits Legal Snag, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1983, at OC3.
163John Balzar, Deukmejian, Unfazed by Prop. 39 Loss, Vows To 'Reform' State Remapping Laws,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1984, at B3.
64 William Endicott, Prop.39 Ads Point Up Politicians'BadImage, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1984, at
B3 (describing an ad in which Governor Deukmejian said that "Proposition 39 will simply remove
legislators from the process of drawing their own district lines. Proposition 39 will assure fairness.");
see also Keith Love, Governor Blasts Anti-Prop. 39 Ads, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1984, at B18 (quoting
Governor Deukmejian) ("Why should you be concerned about reapportionment? Because (now) it is
virtually impossible to unseat incumbents and it is hard to recruit good people to run for office. You are
denied the best candidates possible.").
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million more on advertisements on behalf of redistricting reform.165 As in
1982, President Reagan and numerous pro-business groups (for example,
the California Manufacturers Association, the California Chamber of
Commerce, the Western Growers166Association) joined the state Republican
Party in support of the initiative.
Democrats, not surprisingly, responded to the initiative by commencing
"all-out warfare" against it. 167 They blasted the proposed commission for
"relying on a small pool of elderly, predominantly Republican retired
appellate court justices"' 168 who might be influenced by conflicts of
interest, 169 for creating nominally competitive districts that would actually
favor the Republican Party, 170 and for reducing public input into the
redistricting process.' 7 ' They raised more than $4 million to fight the
initiative, 172 and won the support of the Los Angeles Times' 73 as well as
several groups that had largely sat out the 1982 election, such as the
California AFL-CIO, the California Trial Lawyers Association, the
Mexican American Political Association, and the NAACP. 174 They also
mounted an extremely effective ad campaign that attacked the initiative for
involving judges in redistricting, 175 and featured actor Jack Lemmon

165See John Balzar, Prop. 39-The Battle That Could Determine the Game, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1984, at A3.
166John Balzar, Campaigns on Prop. 39 End Up Asking Voters To Choose Among Several Evils,

L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1984, at A26. Unlike in 1982, Common Cause was relatively inactive in the 1984
initiative campaign.
167 William Endicott, Deukmejian Launches His Remap Drive, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1984, at
OC A9.
168John Balzar, GOP Remap Plan Trounced in Assembly, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1984, at B3; see
also Tom Hayden, The GOP Takes the Initiative, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1984, at E3 ("Of the 37 retired
judges available to serve, 34 are white, two are black, one is Asian and none is Latino. Only one is a
woman. Twenty are Republicans, II are Democrats and the registration of the other six is unknown.
The youngest is 58 years old and the oldest 94; their average age will be 75 in 1986.").
169See John Balzar, Remapping Plan Causes Turmoil on Wide Front,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1984, at
B3 ("Many retired judges have taken up new vocations that could pose political conflicts with
reapportionment.").
170See Hayden, supra note 1688 ("[A]ny district composed of an equal number of Democrats and
Republicans works to the advantage of the latter" because of Republicans' higher turnout and greater
support from special interest groups.).
171See Balzar, supra note 165 ("Democrats [argue] that it would not permit public participation
and therefore not earn public confidence ... ").
172Mark Gladstone, $4 Million To Battle Remap Plan Sought, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1984, at B3.
173See Editorial, Reapportionment:No on 39, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1984, at C4.
174See Balzar, supra note 166.
175See John Balzar, Brown Labels Anti-Prop. 39 Ads 'Con Jobs', L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1984, at
A3 ("[T]he anti-39 commercials focused tightly on the fact that retired judges, not legislators, would do
the reapportionment. This would lead to backroom judicial deals and politicization of the courts, the
commercials argued."); Douglas Shuit, Deukmejian Remap Effort Gets Boost in Washington, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at 3 (quoting one Democratic ad) ('Judges would be dragged into the political
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making statements like "'Proposition 39, it would make a great moviemoney, power, back
room deals with judges. Ohhh. But it would make
17 6
law."'
one lousy
On election day, 45 percent of the electorate supported Proposition 39
and 55 percent voted against it. Republicans benefited relative to 1982
from the energetic support of a popular governor. But, unlike in 1982, they
were outspent by the initiative's opponents and did not enjoy the same
unified backing from third-party groups. More importantly, Democrats
appear to have been exceptionally successful at framing the issues in the
initiative campaign.
Powerful anti-initiative ads swamped Governor
Deukmejian's message about fair representation, and convinced voters that
judges could not be trusted to conduct redistricting. The governor admitted
the effectiveness of the commercials a month before the election, 177 and
observers afterwards concluded that "'television commercials [had] a lot to
do with' the initiative's loss at the polls because "'they play[ed] not only
upon people's rational understanding of these issues but also their
emotions. ,,178
9. California, 1990 (Failed)
California's next campaign over redistricting initiatives unfolded in
1990, when two separate reapportionment-related measures were on the
ballot. The first, sponsored by Republican businessman Gary Flynn, would
have allowed the state legislature to continue drawing district lines, but
would have required a two-thirds vote by the Assembly and Senate as well
as voter approval before a redistricting plan could become law. 179 The
second, of more interest here, would have created a twelve-member
commission to conduct redistricting. The commission members would
have been selected by a panel of three retired state appellate judges, and
would have included five Democrats, five Republicans, and two
independents. The commission would not actually have drafted district
back room-like Chicago and other places with political machines. Only political cronies would ever
be appointed judge."')
176William Endicott, Prop. 39 Ads Point Up Politicians'Bad Image, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1984, at
B3.

177See Love, supra note 1644 (quoting Governor Deukmejian) (The Democrats' ads 'are
considered effective by some people I've talked to."').
178

See William Endicott, State's Voters Continue Pattern of Inconsistency, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,

1984, at A8 (quoting political scientist Alvin Sokolow). Speaker Brown, a prominent California
Democrat, ironically referred to the anti-initiative commercials as "'the most extensive collection of
con jobs I've ever seen."' Balzar, supranote 175.
79See Tim Schreiner, Broad RedistrictingPlan on June Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1990, at A3.
The measure would have also imposed new ethics requirements on California state legislators.
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maps itself, but would have chosen among plans submitted to it on the
basis of compactness, equal population, preservation of communities of
interest, fair representation for minorities, and competitiveness.' 80
The initiative's supporters were a motley crew. The measure was
announced by Paul Gann, best known as a co-sponsor of the notorious
property tax-cutting Proposition 13, Alan Post, for three decades the state
legislature's nonpartisan budget adviser, and Ellen Elliott, a leader of the
League of Women Voters.18 Also prominent in their support for the
initiative were Alan Heslop, former executive director of the California
Republican Party,' 8 2 former President Reagan, 8 3 major corporations such
as Chevron and Hewlett Packard, 8 4 and a handful of Democrats not
holding elected office. 8 5 Unlike in 1984, however, Governor Deukmejian
was not very active in the campaign, 8 6 and many Republican state
legislators actually opposed the initiative because they were afraid that its
competitiveness requirement would imperil their seats in addition to those
of their Democratic opponents.'8 7 Supporters of the measure spent about
$700,000 gathering signatures' 88 and close to $1 million on campaign
commercials, I1 9 some of which featured actor Charlton Heston accusing

'80

See Proposition 119, 1990, http://traynor.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/16033/calprop.txt

(last visited Oct. 15, 2007); Editorial, Getting Politics Out of Politics?, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1989, at
B4.
18 See id. (referring to the "curious coalition" in support of the initiative); Carl Ingram,
Reapportion Plan Calls for Bipartisan Commission, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1989, at B3.
812 See Daniel M. Weintraub & Jerry Gillam, Remap Process No Longer a Narrow Political
Concern, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, at Al.
183See Joe Scott, Op-Ed., GOP Redistrict Plan Gets a Reagan Boost, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1990, at
M8.
M
14 See Daniel M. Weintraub, Fraud Charges Traded on Redistricting Propositions, L.A. TIMES,
May 17, 1990, at A3.
185See Daniel M. Weintraub, Voters Could Radically Alter Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, May 27,
1990, at A3.
186See John Balzar, Stunned State GOP Looks to Voters for Rescue on Redistricting in '90, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1989, at 21 (quoting Governor Deukmejian) (.'I would be happy to talk about it to
individuals who are interested in [the initiative], but I think it's a very difficult subject we learned from
... a few years ago. It's a very difficult topic to be able to get the average voter to relate to."'). I did
not find any quotes about the initiative from Governor Deukmejian until the eve of the election. See
Vlae Kershner, Crucial Effect of Reapportionment Vote, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 1990, at A 12.
'8' See Tim Schreiner, Defeat of Redistricting Plans Casts Pall on GOP Session, S.F. CHRON., July
20, 1990, at Al 1 ("[A]Imost all GOP legislators, afraid of losing their own seats in a commissiondrawn redistricting, opposed [the initiative]."). In my view, this overstates the extent of Republican
opposition to Proposition 119. But it is true that most elected Republican politicians preferred
Proposition 118, which would have left the redistricting power with the legislature, to Proposition 119.
188See Ingram, supra note 181.
189See Daniel M. Weintraub, Redistricting Measures Costliest on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1990,
at A29.
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Democrats of "conn[ing]" the public.' 9" The most common arguments
made on behalf of the initiative were that it would make California's
elections more competitive, 19'192and eliminate districts that "look like pieces
in an intricate jigsaw puzzle."'
California Democrats mounted a unified-and very well-fundedcampaign against the initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie Brown led the
opposition (and even promised to make legislative redistricting fairer if the
initiative failed), 93 while State Senator Bill Lockyer, 194 civil rights leader
Jesse Jackson, 95 and Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti196 also
loudly criticized the measure. As in 1982 and 1984, Democrats accused
Republicans of trying to "'gain control by line-drawing rather than by
political competition, '""9' and of proposing a commission that would be
dominated by special interests and "mostly old, white men."' 198 The
Democrats were joined in opposition to the measure by the National
Organization for Women, various Hispanic groups, the Sierra Club, the
Los Angeles Times's editorial page, 199 and, most surprisingly, Common
Cause, a prominent good government group that initially backed the
initiative but later changed its mind. 200 Democrats and their allies also
massively outspent the measure's supporters, with estimates of their
expenditures ranging from five to eight million dollars. 20 1 This enormous
war chest was used to fund a series of devastatingly effective commercials
190 See Daniel

M. Weintraub, CaliforniaElections: The Ad Campaigns,L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1990,

at A34.
191See Weintraub, supra note 185 (quoting League of Women Voters leader Ellen Elliott) ("'We
have legislators who are less responsive to voters and less focused on resolving major issues, because
they know they have a very good chance of being reelected, regardless of how ineffective they may
be."'); Weintraub & Gillam, supra note 1822 ("Since 1984, incumbents in the state Senate, Assembly
and California's congressional delegation have won 393 races and lost only 7.").
192Weintraub & Gillam, supra note 1822.
193See Greg Lucas, Speaker Brown's Promise on Redistricting,S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1990, at A16.
194See Greg Lucas, Yet Another RedistrictingPlan, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 1990, at A12.
195 See Greg Lucas, Jackson in Redistricting Fight, S.F. CHRON., May 22, 1990, at A7
("Propositions 118 and 119, Jackson said in his trademark rhyming style, represent a 'scheme of
dilution, a scheme of exclusion."').
196See Vlae Kershner, Stars'Role in Redistricting Vote, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 1990, at A2 ("The
Democrats' television commercials ... were so effective in crushing Propositions 118 and 119 by 2-to1 ratios that Republicans hardly knew whether to complain or nominate them for awards.").
197See Weintraub & Gillam, supra note 1822 (quoting Speaker Brown).
198See Joe Scott, Op-Ed., Old Allies Go to War over Remap, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1990, at M5
(quoting Speaker Brown).
199See Editorial, An Unreliable Way To Realign Voters, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1990, at B6.
However, the San FranciscoChronicle endorsed the initiative. See Editorial, Yes on 118 and 119, S.F.
CHRON., May 20, 1990, Sunday Punch, at 1.
200See Daniel M. Weintraub, Common Cause Opposes Plan for Redistricting Commission, L.A.
TIMES, May 2, 1990, at A3; Weintraub, supra note 1844; Weintraub, supra note 1855.
201See Schreiner, supra note 187; Weintraub, supra note 1899.
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starring actors James Garner, Bea Arthur, and, in a reprise appearance,
Jack Lemmon.2 °2
Both redistricting initiatives on the ballot were trounced at the polls,
with Proposition 119 (which would have created the commission) winning
just 36 percent of the vote. As in 1984, Democrats' speeches and ads
convinced much of the public that the measure would have enabled sinister
special interests to seize control of the state's redistricting process. Bob
Marks, campaign manager for the Yes-on- 119 campaign, said that he knew
his side was in trouble "when my mother called me up after she saw the
20 3
Jim Garner ad and said 'Are you sure I should vote for this?'
Compared to 1984, the Democrats also enjoyed a much greater spending
advantage, more backing from third-party groups, and, critically, a
As noted above, Governor Deukmejian was
fractured opposition.
lukewarm in his support for Proposition 119 and many Republicans
criticized the measure. At an acrimonious party conference a month after
the initiative was defeated, conservative rebels actually submitted a
resolution criticizing the "ineffectual, incompetent, and wasteful"
campaign on behalf of the measure, and asked for an audit to "determine
where the party's money was spent and why it fumbled the campaign[]. ' 2°
10. Arizona, 2000 (Succeeded)
During the 1990s, Arizona's state and federal elections were strikingly
uncompetitive 2 0 5 and complaints were raised about the strange shapes of
some electoral districts. °6 In 2000, a coalition of good government
groups, the Arizona Democratic Party (long the minority in the state
legislature), and wealthy real estate developer Jim Pedersen sought to enact
redistricting reform. The initiative they drafted would create a fivemember redistricting commission; state appellate judges would select a
pool of twenty-five candidates, the House and Senate majority and
202 See

Kershner, supra note 196.
data reveals the impact of the Democrats' ad blitz, which was unleashed in the final two

203Id. Poll

weeks of the campaign. A month before the election, Proposition 119 led by eight points. See
Weintraub, supra note 185. It ended up losing by twenty-eight.
204See Schreiner, supra note 1877.
205See Chris Moeser, House Supports RedistrictingPlan, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 5, 1999, at 23A
(noting that seventeen state senators and twenty-two state representatives had no opponent in the last
election); Put the Crayons Back in the Box!, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 27, 1999, at 6B [hereinafter
Crayons in Box] ("Arizona legislators seeking re-election have won 96 percent of their races since 1992
....

.).

206See Pat Flannery, Keeping Politics in Line, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 2000, at I (describing
Congressional District 7 as "a beast gobbling up disparate communities from the Cashion
neighborhood in the West Valley to Guadalupe in the East Valley and from the Fort McDowell Indian
Community near Scottsdale to Casa Grande.").
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minority leaders would each appoint one commission member from this
pool, and the four partisan appointees would choose a fifth individual to be
the commission's chairperson. The commission would then draft state and
federal district maps on the basis of equal population, compactness,
contiguity, respect for communities of interest, preservation of political
boundaries, and competitiveness.2 7
The redistricting initiative, Proposition 106, was supported by an
unusual mix of actors. Arizona Democrats, not surprisingly, strongly
backed the measure in hope that it would weaken Republicans' grip on the
state legislature and congressional delegation. 20 ' Good government groups
such as Common Cause and the League of Women Voters also endorsed
the measure, seeing it as an "antidote to Arizona's checkered redistricting
history. 20 9 These predictable supporters were joined by a number of
prominent Republicans: former Governor Rose Mofford, Superintendent of
Public Instruction Lisa Keegan, former Attorney General Grant Woods,
Phoenix Mayor Skip Rimsza, State Representative Sue Gerard, among
others.2 10 Almost every executive branch official in Arizona also
supported the initiative, 21 1 and the governor, Republican Jane Dee Hull,
kept her views on redistricting reform to herself.21 2 Finally, Arizona's
most important newspaper, the Arizona Republic, maintained a steady
drumbeat of support for Proposition 106.213 From February 1999 through
election day, the Republic published a series of editorials with titles such as

207See David K. Pauole, Comment, Race, Politics & (In)equality: Proposition 106 Alters the Face
and Rules of Redistricting in Arizona, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1219, 1222-26 (2001).
208See, e.g., Andy Nichols, Let Commission, Not Legislature,Redistrict State, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Jan. 3, 1999, at 6B (column in support of redistricting commission by Democratic State Representative
Andy Nichols); Robbie Sherwood, Nov. Ballot May Carry 17 Questions, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 7,
2000, at IA (quoting Democrat Attorney General Janet Napolitano) ("This will create more
competitive districts where you have strong candidates fighting each other over ideas. Will it work or
be perfect? Who knows? But it's a good start."); Voters Deserve Fair Redistricting, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1999, at 6B [hereinafter Voters Deserve] (quoting failed Democratic congressional
candidate Sam Coppersmith) ("Republicans like competition in everything except their own seats.").
209Flannery, supra note 206.

210 See Pauole, supra note 2077, at 1220; Chris Moeser, Redistricting Change Sought, ARIZ.

REPUBLIC, Sept. 14, 1999, at 1B (quoting Woods) ("Idon't believe our Legislature has reflected the
will of Arizonans on the most important issues very often in the '90s."); Voters Deserve, supra note
208. 211 Nonpartisan
Panel is Vital, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 2000,
at 6B ("Phoenix Mayor Skip
Rimsza and Scottsdale Mayor Sam Campana and every other mayor who has so far seen a presentation
of the [initiative] plan" have supported it.).
212 1 was unable to find a single newspaper story describing Governor Hull's position on
Proposition 106.
213The Republic is no bleeding-heart liberal newspaper. It endorsed George W. Bush for President
in 2000. See In Election 2000... We Recommend, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 2000, at 9B.
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21 5
214
Put the Crayons Back in the Box! and Stop the Music on Redistricting,

and at one point issued a weekly "redistricting countdown" tracking the
progress of the initiative's backers in gathering signatures.216 Proposition
106's supporters stressed the enormous advantage enjoyed by Arizona
incumbents during the 1990s 21 7 as well as the unseemliness of legislators
218

custom-designing their own districts.
Opposition to the initiative stemmed almost entirely from Republican
legislators and a handful of pro-business interest groups. Arizona's five
Republican congressmen criticized the measure because they believed it
would "lack accountability to voters" and "prove less representative of the
state as a whole. 219 State Senate Majority Leader Rusty Bowers attacked
the initiative because, in his view, a redistricting commission would be just
as political as the legislature but less savvy and knowledgeable about the
state.22 °
And Arizona Republican Party chairman Nathan Sproul
denounced Jim Pedersen, the largest contributor to the pro-initiative side,
and described the Proposition 106 campaign as "just a small group of
special interest individuals trying to hijack the process.",221 As mentioned
above, Arizona Republicans' opposition to Proposition 106 was less than
unanimous, with several important party members either supporting or
remaining silent about the measure.2 22 In addition, the initiative's foes
were forced to raise funds from outside the state in the waning days of the

214Crayons in Box, supra note 205.
215Stop the Music on Redistricting,ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1999, at 8B.
216See, e.g., Redistricting Countdown, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000, at 6B.
217 See Hal Mattern, RedistrictingProcess Targeted, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 2000, at 1A (quoting
Arizona Common Cause Executive Director Dennis Burke) ("This proposition would enliven Arizona
politics in a good way. We wouldn't have all of these unopposed elections .... ).
218 See Pauole, supra note 207, at 1239 ("The most frequently cited argument in favor
of
Proposition 106 concerned the prevalent role of political self-interest in the drawing of district
boundaries."); Redrawing Districts Is a Right of Citizens, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 2000, at 8B
[hereinafter Right of Citizens] (arguing that the initiative's opponents "have the existing system greased
for their own self gain").
219See Pauole, supra note 207, at 1221.
220 See Mattem, supra note 2177 (quoting Bowers) ("'If you think [the members of the
commission] are going to have an increased amount of intelligence and less political interest, you are
wrong."').
221 Robbie Sherwood, 66 percent in Poll Back Prop. 106, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 2000,
at 5B;
see also David Leibowitz, Op-Ed., What Do You Know About Prop. 106, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 27,
2000 ("One man, wealthy shopping mall developer Jim Pederson, has bankrolled Prop. 106.... Who is
he? What's his political background? What's in it for him?").
222See Right of Citizens, supra note 2188 ("[Opponents to Proposition 106] don't represent the
party as a whole, because many prominent Republicans... all support redistricting reform in the name
of basic fairness.").
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campaign as they found themselves behind in the polls and short on
cash.223
In the end, Proposition 106 prevailed by a vote of 56 percent for to 44
percent against. The most significant explanation for the initiative's
success was probably the dissension within the Arizona Republican Party.
With Governor Hull uncharacteristically taciturn and many Republicans
voicing their support for the measure, the party was unable to mount a
unified campaign in opposition. Why Arizona Republicans were so
fractured, though, is a more vexing question; legislative majorities in other
states have not had nearly as much difficulty maintaining a common front
when challenged by redistricting initiatives. The answer appears to be
threefold. First, the Arizona Republic's extraordinary campaign on behalf
of redistricting reform made the commission a major issue from early 1999
onward, and generated negative attention for all Republicans that tried to
thwart it-but praise for politicians that bucked their party on the issue.
Second, Republicans in the state legislature made the tactical mistake in
1999 of proposing a redistricting commission themselves, albeit one that
would have been staffed by six Republicans and three Democrats. 4
Because of this decision, party members found it difficult down the road to
argue that commissions were intrinsically unrepresentative and susceptible
to special interest domination. Third, it was primarily Republicans who
were not legislators (such as mayors and state cabinet members) that
supported the initiative. These politicians had much less to lose if the
measure passed, and were also less susceptible to pressure from the party
apparatus.
11. California,2005 (Failed)
The highest-profile redistricting initiative ever-thanks to the
enthusiastic support of Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzeneggerrecently took place in California. In the 2004 general election, not a single
incumbent in the Assembly, Senate, or California congressional delegation
had been beaten, and not a single seat had changed parties.225 Governor
Schwarzenegger therefore made redistricting by nonpartisan commission a
central pillar of the reform package that he pushed in 2005. He first tried
223

See id

("No wonder the opposition to Proposition 106 has had to appeal to the Nevada

Republican Party for a substantial part of its funding.").
224 See Ruben Navarette Jr., Groscost Moves Toward Gluttony on Redistricting, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,

Feb. 24, 1999, at 2B.
225See John Wildermuth, Some Suspect Governor's Plan to Redraw District Lines, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 2, 2005, at Al7.
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to convince the Democratic-dominated state legislature to enact his
proposal. 226 When this effort (rather predictably) failed, he ordered a
special election in which redistricting reform and several other measures
would be put to a statewide vote.22 7
Proposition 77 would have created a three-member commission to carry
out California's state and federal redistricting. The state's Judicial Council
would have chosen at random a pool of twenty-four retired judges, the
Assembly and Senate majority and minority leaders would each have
selected three judges from the opposing party, the four legislators would
then each have vetoed one of the remaining twelve judges, and finally the
three commission members would have been picked randomly from the
eight judges still on the list. The commission would have drawn districts
on the basis of equal population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political boundaries, and would have been barred from considering the
potential effects of redistricting on incumbents or political parties. 8
Governor Schwarzenegger was by far the most important proponent of
Proposition 77. He made redistricting reform a major issue in 2005,
personally involved himself in the initiative's drafting, raised large
amounts of money for the pro-initiative side, and campaigned vigorously
on behalf of the measure. According to Schwarzenegger, Proposition 77
would have made California's elections more competitive, 229 helped more
moderate politicians at the expense of extremists on both ends of the
political spectrum, 23° and returned California to the widely respected
judge-drawn districts that the state enjoyed in the 1990s. 231 Several
important organizations joined Schwarzenegger in support of the initiative,
including Citizens to Save California,23 2 the Rose Institute,233 Common
226See John M. Hubbell, Plan Puts Redistrictingin Judges'Hands,S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2005, at
B3 (describing the constitutional amendment proposed by Republicans in the state legislature).
227See Jordan Rau, GovernorPuts Agenda on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at Al.
228 See John Wildermuth, RedistrictingInitiative Would Set State Apart, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005,
at B3.
229See Wildermuth, supra note 2255 ("'1 think we have to do a redistricting' to make the elections
more competitive, Schwarzenegger said. 'I think this is a very, very important thing that we have to
make part of our reforms."').
230See id. ("[T]he governor is trying to put more moderate Republicans in office at the expense of
conservatives ....).
231See Nancy Vogel, Looking To Design a FairerMap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at BI (referring
to the "rosy rearview glow of California's judge-drawn lines in the 1990s"); id. (quoting a Rose
Institute official) ('We had 10 years of really good districts, and people saw that it was possible for an
unbiased source to draw [them]."').
232See Peter Nicholas, Group to Aid Gov. 's Pushfor Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at
B1.
Citizens to Save California was an umbrella organization dedicated to promoting all of Governor
Schwarzenegger's 2005 initiatives.
233See Vogel, supra note 231.
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Cause, 234 and various business interests. 235 Both the Los Angeles Times 23 6
and the San Francisco Chronicle237 also endorsed Proposition 77.
Together Schwarzenegger and his allies raised approximately $5 million
for advertising and other campaign activities. 238
A coalition of California Democrats, traditionally pro-Democratic
groups, and skeptical Republicans opposed Proposition 77. Some of the
most vocal Democratic critics were U.S. House Representatives Nancy
Pelosi 239 and Howard Berman, 240 both of whom raised significant sums to
defeat the measure. Groups that came out against the initiative included
the Alliance for a Better California,24 1 the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund,242 the California Teachers Association, the
California State Council of Service Employees, and other major unions.243
Most notably, a number of prominent California Republicans publicly
broke with Governor Schwarzenegger over Proposition 77. U.S. House
Representative John Doolittle declared that "[a]s a conservative
Republican, it makes me very nervous when I hear people say that their
overt objective is to remove the conservatives.",244
The national
Republican Party also opposed the initiative, and by some counts sixteen of
California's twenty Republicans
in Congress disagreed with
Schwarzenegger about redistricting reform.24 5
The opponents of
Proposition 77 dramatically outspent the measure's supporters.24 6 Their
234 See

Carla Marinucci & John Wildermuth, Prop. 77 Splits Common Cause in State, S.F. CHRON.,

Oct. 18, 2005, at B2. However, several board members of the California chapter of Common Cause
opposed the national organization's decision to endorse Proposition 77. See id.

See Nicholas, supra note 232.
236See A New PoliticalLandscape, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at M4.
237See The Chronicle Recommends: Prop. 77, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2005, at B8.
238See Dan Morain, RedistrictingDrama Adds a Producer,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at B4.
239 See Christian Berthelsen, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught up in Donations Dispute,
235

S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3 (quoting Rep. Pelosi) ("'I am very committed to defeating Proposition
77, and I am raising money to defeat it."'); Hubbell, supra note 226.

240 See John Wildermuth, Incumbents Team up To Oppose Schwarzenegger on Prop. 77, S.F.

CHRON., Aug. 26, 2005, at BI.

241 See Dan Morain, Coffers Bulging for Special Election, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at BI.

Alliance for a Better California, dedicated to defeating all of Schwarzenegger's 2005 initiatives, was
the Democratic counterpart to Citizens to Save California.

242 See John Wildermuth, Debate on Prop. 77 over Retired Judges, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2005, at

BI.

243 See John Wildermuth & Carla Marinucci, Business, Labor Ante
up in Playfor Power, S.F.

CHRON., Sept. 26, 2005, at Al ("California public employee unions, fighting for their political lives,
are betting more than $60 million that they can defeat Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's package of
initiatives Nov. 8.").
24
245

See Peter Nicholas, GOP Fears a RedistrictingBackfire, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at Al.
See id; see also Wildermuth, supra note 240 ("Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger also faces a revolt

from GOP congress members worried that the initiative could cost them their seats.").
24 See Morain, supra note 238; Wildermuth & Marinucci, supranote 243.
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arguments focused on the impossibility of removing politics from the
redistricting process, 47 the impropriety of conducting a second, middecade redistricting, 248 the sense that the initiative was nothing more than a
"power grab by the party that's not in power, ' ' 249 the difficulty of
implementing the initiative's proposals in time for the 2006 election 25 0 and
the fear that the national Democratic Party would be hurt if the measure
passed and California Democrats lost seats in Congress as a result. 5 1
Proposition 77 lost by a wide margin on election day, with 40 percent of
the vote in favor compared to 60 percent against. As in previous California
initiative campaigns, the unified and forceful opposition of the state
Democratic Party framed the debate as a partisan struggle rather than a
The measure's prospects were also
question of good government.
damaged by the dissension within the California Republican Party. While
almost every major Democrat loudly criticized the initiative, many
Republicans remained silent or joined the disparaging Democratic chorus.
Governor Schwarzenegger did enthusiastically back Proposition 77, but
previous California campaigns show that gubernatorial support alone does
not ensure a measure's passage. Moreover, Schwarzenegger's once skyhigh approval ratings had plummeted by November 2005, thus further
reducing his influence over the electorate. As one observer commented
just before the election, "[t]here's a negative drag created by Arnold that
spans across all of the propositions that he's supporting, and it doesn't
leave a lot of room for him to move. 252
12. Ohio, 2005 (Failed)
The last of the twelve redistricting initiatives took place in Ohio in
2005. In the previous year's election, Ohio Democrats had won 49 percent
of the congressional vote but just 33 percent of the seats, 48 percent of the
state House vote but just 42 percent of the seats, and 37 percent of the state
247 See Peter Nicholas, Gov. To CallforSpecial Session, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at AI (quoting

Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez) ('You'll never be able to rid [redistricting] of politics."').

248See Hubbell, supra note 226 (quoting Rep. Pelosi) ('"[I]t's up to the public to ask. . . why the

governor would want to do this in mid-decade. That is a question fraught with meaning."').

249See Vogel, supra note 231 (quoting Speaker Nunez); see also John Wildermuth, 'Nonpartisan'

Measure Draws Partisan Debate, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 27, 2005, at B2 (quoting State Senator Gloria

Romero) ("'One party is trying to get more control, and another party is trying to defend against it."').
250See Wildermuth, supra note 2499 (quoting election expert Karin MacDonald) ("'It would be
incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to get this done before Dec. 30."').

251See Ethan Rarick, Learning To Love Gerrymandering,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5 ("I will

support a nonpartisan redistricting of Democrat-dominated California on the same day I can be assured
of similar fairness in Republican states.").

252 See Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Governor Losing His Star Power in Special Election, SAN

FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 31, 2005, at B 1.
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Senate vote but just 19 percent of the seats.253 Moreover, the average
margin of victory in Ohio's state and federal races was 35 percentage
points.254 In response to these perceived electoral flaws, a group called
Reform Ohio Now proposed an initiative that would have created a new
five-member redistricting commission for Ohio. Senior state court judges
of different party affiliations would have chosen the first two commission
members, and those two commissioners would have selected the remaining
three members (one Democrat, one Republican, and one independent).
The commission would have adopted the state and federal district maps
that created the most competitive districts, except that plans that sacrificed
some competitiveness for greater compactness and community
preservation could be chosen.2 55
Reform Ohio Now, the main backer of the redistricting initiative (Issue
4) as well as two other propositions on the 2005 ballot, was a "nonprofit
coalition of mostly moderate and liberal-leaning interests. 2 56 It was
funded primarily by foundations and individual donors (many of them
from outside Ohio),

57

and endorsed by groups such as Common Cause, the

AFL-CIO and other unions, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club.258 Ohio's
Democratic legislators were also nominally in favor of Issue 4,259 but were
not especially vocal in their support, probably because more competitive
districts would have put their own seats in play in addition to those of their
Republican opponents. 260 The initiative's backers highlighted Ohio's
history of uncompetitive races and argued that the ethical scandals
surrounding Republican Governor Robert Taft were evidence of the need
253 See Joe Hallett,

Ohio Ballot Issue 4: Redistricting Comes Under Scrutiny, COLUMBUS

DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2005, at 01A.
254 See Editorial, There Is a Better Way, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2005, at 04B.
255
See Hallett, supra note 253 ("The commission could accept a plan that scores two points lower

on the competitiveness scale for congressional districts and four points lower for legislative districts if
the plan does a better job of making the districts compact and keeps communities intact."); Joe Hallett,
Reform Would Wrest Pen of Powerfrom State 's PoliticalLine-Drawers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June

26, 2005, at 01C.

256Jim Siegel, Group Pushing Election Reform Inches Closer to Ballot, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,

July 22, 2005, at 03B.
257See id.
("The group has raised money from a variety of sources including: Alida Messinger, of
New York, a major donor to liberal causes and daughter of oil magnate John D. Rockefeller Ill; the
Ohio Federation of Teachers; the Rockefeller Family Fund; the Ohio Public Interest Research Group

Citizen Lobby; the Public Interest Projects Inc., of New York; and therestofus.org ....
").
258

See

About

Reform

Ohio

Now,

http://www.reformohionow.org/content.jsp?content_KEY=577&t=about (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).

259See There Is a Better Way, supra note 254 ("Naturally, Ohio Democrats favor reform.").
260See Jim Siegel, Redistricting Amendment: Proposal Could Mean Fewer Black Legislators,

COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2005, at 01A (noting that one prominent Ohio Democrat "still ha[d]
some questions" about a month before the election, and that the Ohio black caucus had not yet decided

to endorse Issue 4).
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for redistricting reform. 261 A typical commercial intoned that "[t]here's a
culture of corruption in our government" and claimed that Issue 4 would
"help get rid of the special interest money, hold the politicians accountable
and clean up the corruption once and for all."262
Ohio's Republicans furiously opposed Issue 4, forming a new
organization, Ohio First, to direct the effort against the measure. Because
of his poor poll numbers, Governor Taft kept a relatively low profile
during the campaign, but prominent legislators such as House Speaker Jon
Husted, State Senator Kevin Coughlin, and State Representative Kevin
DeWine loudly denounced the initiative.263 Thanks to intense fundraising
and support from pro-business groups such as the Ohio Chamber of
Commerce, 26 opponents of Issue 4 substantially outspent the measure's
backers. 265 They used their war chest to assemble a large team of
consultants (including the producers of the anti-John Kerry Swift Boat ads)
and bombard the Ohio airwaves with critical commercials.2 66 The main
themes sounded by the ads were that Issue 4 was put on the ballot by
"wealthy, out-of-state liberals trying to hijack Ohio's elections, 26 7 and that
the initiative would transfer control of redistricting to faceless
bureaucrats.26 8 Opponents of Issue 4 also argued that it was a mistake to
privilege competitiveness above other redistricting criteria, proving their
point by producing a sample district map with "districts shaped like string
beans" that the new commission would be required to adopt because of its
261

See Hallett, supra note 249 (quoting Erin Bowser, director of the Ohio Public Interest Research

Group) ('All of the various scandals happening now... reinforce how regular citizens are being shut
out of the process and how difficult it is to hold elected officials accountable when they're in safe

districts and they can't get beat."').
262

BureaucratsBad; So Are Politicians,CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 9C.

See Hallett, supra note 253; Siegel, supra note 256. Coughlin even "admitted telling another
lobbyist that he killed [a bill favored by Democrat Paul Tipps] to get back at Tipps for co-writing" the
263

redistricting initiative. See Joe Hallett, Legislator Put Preservinga Safe District over Saving Cities'
Money, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 2005, at 05D.
264 See Siegel, supra note 252 ("The Ohio Chamber of Commerce, a major player in state elections,
is concerned that the provisions create an uneven playing field that favors unions over businesses.").

265See Mark Niquette & Jim Siegel, Election-System Proposals:Initiatives' Friends, Foes Search
for Easy Labels, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2005, at 01B.
266 See Sandy Theis, Election Issue Foes Fear Voices of Ohio Voters Would Be Stifled, PLAIN

DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 18, 2005, at B2.
267See Niquette & Siegel, supra note 265; see also Sandy Theis, Two Ballot Issues Unclear, Poll
Finds, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 2005, at B3 ("A new ad that appears in Christian
newspapers even tags [Reform Ohio Now] supporters as those who 'took prayer out of our public
schools."').

268See Bureaucrats Bad; So Are Politicians,supra note 262 (quoting an anti-Issue 4 ad) ("'[T]he
costly election amendments would create new state bureaucracies filled with political appointees who
have no minimum qualifications.... With all the scandals in Columbus, do we really want bureaucrats
to have more control?').
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high competitiveness score. 2269

Most of Ohio's newspapers joined
Republicans in calling for a 'No' vote on Issue 4.270
On November 8, 2005, Issue 4 lost with just 30 percent of the vote for
compared to 70 percent against-the worst defeat of any of the twelve
redistricting initiatives. Following a sort of political Murphy's Law, almost
everything that could go wrong did go wrong for the measure. Issue 4's
natural supporters, Ohio Democrats, were lukewarm in their advocacy
because of concern about how their own reelection chances might be
affected if the initiative passed. Reform Ohio Now was easily dismissed as
a collection of out-of-state liberals. The initiative's critics were wellorganized and well-funded, and their media barrage was considered to
have been particularly effective. And turnout on election day was low,
particularly in Ohio's cities, as voters confused by the complicated
initiatives and reluctant to participate in a special election stayed home.27'
III. PATTERNS AND LESSONS
In seventy years of effort, four redistricting initiatives have succeeded
and eight have failed. Part II described in detail all twelve initiatives, and
posited some explanations for why each one passed or was defeated. This
section considers the measures collectively rather than individually, and
attempts to reach some broader conclusions about why redistricting
initiatives succeed or fail, what reformers can do to make success more
likely in the future, and how accurately the academic literature explains the
initiatives' outcomes.
A. Patterns in the Past
Redistricting initiatives' odds of passage are actually worse than they
seem. In total, four out of twelve have prevailed at the polls, but two of
those successes-Arkansas (1936) and Oklahoma (1962)-took place

269See

Hallett, supra note 253; see also Joe Hallett, Jim Siegel & Mark Niquette, Ohio's Issue 4

Aims To Inject Competition into Legislative Races, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2005, at OIA

(quoting Ohio First spokesman Jim Tilling) ("'In order to get competitiveness, you have to distort
everything else."').
270 See Mixed Bag of Reforms, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 23, 2005, at H2; Vote Today-

There 's Lots at Stake, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 8, 2005, at 12B. But see There Is a Better Way,
supra note 250 (expressing support for the principle of redistricting reform).
271See Sandy Theis & Reginald Fields, Scandals Get Little Reaction on Issues, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 9, 2005, at BI ("[L]ow turnout in the cities indicated that Democrats failed to get
their supporters to the polls. Others blamed voter confusion and said [Reform Ohio Now] made a
mistake by pitching four complex issues at once.").
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before or around the time of Baker v. Carr.272 Those measures' supporters,
unlike backers of redistricting reform in the forty years since Baker, were
able to point out the obvious unfairness of electoral districts that vary
widely in population. They did not have to resort to the second-order
argument that even when the one-person, one-vote principle is respected,
democratic values can still be subverted by clever district-drawing. In the
post-Baker era, only two out of nine redistricting initiatives have
succeeded, compared to two out of three in the period before the Supreme
Court entered the political thicket.
As a group, the campaigns over the failed redistricting initiatives were
quite different from the campaigns over the successful measures. As
Appendix B, infra, indicates, the initiatives' proponents were outspent in
four of the seven failed campaigns for which I have information, but had
greater resources than their adversaries in the one successful campaign for
which an assessment is possible.273 The state governor twice opposed the
initiative in failed campaigns but never fought against a successful
initiative. The majority party in the state legislature strongly opposed all
eight failed initiatives, but never vigorously resisted a successful initiative.
(In the three successful campaigns for which I have information, the
legislative majority party was split once and weakly opposed to the
initiative twice.) 274 The minority party in the state legislature was split
twice and weakly in favor thrice in the failed campaigns, but supported all
three of the successful measures for which I have information.275 In failed
campaigns, major newspapers supported the initiative twice, opposed it
four times, and were split twice, while in successful campaigns they
endorsed the measure thrice and were split once.2 76 Interest groups were
split six times and supportive of the measure twice in failed campaigns, but
were split just once and supportive twice in successful campaigns. 277 All
of the successful campaigns unfolded in the wake of a recent egregious
gerrymander, and twice they took place in the shadow of important
relevant national developments; on the other hand, one of the failed
campaigns was not provoked by an especially awful gerrymander, and
none of them were accompanied by major national events. 27 ' Finally,
U.S. 186 (1962).
infra Appendix B.
id.
275See id. However, the intensity of support from the state legislative minority party varied in the
272 369
273See
274See

successful initiative campaigns.
276 See id.
277 See id
278 See id.
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opponents of redistricting reform were more effective at framing the debate
in seven of the failed campaigns but none of the successful campaigns.27 9
The (rather intuitive) upshot is that redistricting initiatives are more
likely to succeed when their supporters outspend and outframe the
opposition, the legislative majority party is split or weakly opposed, the
governor and the legislative minority party are strongly supportive,
newspapers and interest groups endorse the measure, a blatant gerrymander
has recently occurred, and favorable developments are transpiring on the
national stage. But it is possible to advance this analysis further. First,
state governors are basically powerless to get a redistricting initiative to
pass (though they may be able to accomplish the reverse, that is, to ensure
a measure's defeat through their energetic opposition). In three casesOklahoma (1960), California (1984), and California (2005)-governors
made the passage of a redistricting measure their top campaign priority,
only to see those initiatives lose by an average of twenty points. Moreover,
none of the four successful initiatives enjoyed strong gubernatorial
support; only once, in Oklahoma (1962), was the governor's favorable
position clear from newspaper coverage, and even in that campaign
Governor Edmondson was a lame duck and devoted little effort to passing
the initiative.
Second, the minority party in the state legislature is similarly incapable
of propelling a redistricting initiative to success at the polls. The minority
party strongly supported a redistricting measure four times2 80 and weakly
supported such a measure five more times, 8 l yet only three of those
initiatives succeeded. And in the three successful cases, the minority
party's support for the initiative was weak twice--Oklahoma (1962) and
Colorado (1974)-and strong only in Arizona (2000), a campaign in which
the Republicans' internal strife was probably more important than the
Democrats' unified advocacy. However, actual splits in (as opposed to
lukewarm support from) the minority party correlate perfectly with defeat
on election day. California Republicans divided over the 1990 and 2005
redistricting initiatives, and those measures lost by twenty-eight and twenty
points, respectively.
Third, the actual content of a redistricting initiative also has little impact
on the measure's fate at the polls; the eight failed proposals do not look
279See id.
280 These

cases were North Dakota (1973), California (1982), California (1984), and Arizona

(2000).
28' These cases were Oklahoma (1960), Oklahoma (1962), Colorado (1974), Ohio (1981), and Ohio
(2005).
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appreciably different from the four that passed. Oklahoma's successful
1962 initiative, for example, was almost identical to the measure that the
state's voters rejected in 1960. Similarly, the successful initiatives in
Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000)-both of which created commissions
that draw districts on the basis of a set of familiar redistricting criteriastrongly resemble the failed initiatives in California (1982), California
(1984), California (1990), and California (2005). The only conclusion that
can be drawn about initiatives' content is that relatively unorthodox
proposals are certain to fail. Ohio's 1981 initiative, which would have
required the commission to adopt the plans with the greatest district
compactness, and Ohio's 2005 initiative, which would have privileged
competitiveness above all other redistricting criteria, were defeated by an
average of twenty-eight points.
Two more factors that seem relatively unimportant in explaining
initiative success or failure are interest group positions and recent
egregious gerrymanders. In most campaigns-seven of the eleven that I
was able to assess-important interests lined up on both sides of the
measure, making their overall influence a wash. In the four campaigns in
which most interests backed one side (always the pro-initiative side), the
measures passed twice and were defeated twice. And those two
successes-Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000)--were almost certainly
not attributable to interest groups' endorsements or mobilization, which by
all accounts played a small role in both campaigns. As for glaring
gerrymanders, they are unfortunately so prevalent that they provide no
meaningful distinction between successful and unsuccessful redistricting
initiatives. Seven of the eight failed initiatives took place shortly after an
especially offensive redistricting exercise, as did all four of the initiatives
that prevailed.
So what factors do account for why some initiatives succeed and some
fail? The most important single variable appears to be the intensity of the
legislative majority party's opposition to the measure. In the eight cases
where the majority party strongly opposed an initiative, the initiative failed
every time. But in the four cases where the majority party's position was
unclear or split or only weakly opposed, the initiative succeeded every
time. This finding makes a good deal of sense. Legislators from the
majority party in a state are the main targets of redistricting initiatives (as
well as the primary beneficiaries of the gerrymandered status quo). They
are also members of the party that most of the electorate supports, at least
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in legislative elections.282 So it is not surprising that the majority party in
the state legislature vehemently opposes most redistricting initiatives, or
that those initiatives fail as a result of its strident opposition.
But it is not just the fact of intense majority party resistance that dooms
initiatives, but also the kind of campaign that the resistance engenders. In
case after case, majority party legislators responded to a threatening
redistricting measure by raising large sums of money, campaigning
furiously against the measure, and striving to frame the debate in the most
advantageous possible terms. As Appendix B shows, when the majority
party strongly opposed a redistricting initiative, it outspent the measure's
supporters four times and was outspent thrice, and was more effective at
framing the debate six times, while never allowing the other side clearly to
seize the rhetorical advantage.283 This means that strong majority party
opposition produces a political environment in which proponents of
redistricting reform face almost insurmountable obstacles. They are
confronted not only by the official hostility of the largest partisan entity in
the state, but also by an anti-initiative effort that is better-funded, able to
call on more prominent politicians as spokesmen, and made up of
legislators desperately fighting for their political lives.
The deeper mystery, then, is why redistricting initiatives ever win-or,
which is to say the same thing, why the state majority party does not
always strongly oppose such measures. The answer is that while the
majority party would always like to fight forcefully against redistricting
reform, forces beyond its control sometimes prevent it from doing so. In
Oklahoma (1962) and Colorado (1974), it was important national
developments that interceded. The Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.
Carr made it clear to Oklahoma Democrats that reapportionment could no
longer be resisted. Even if they thwarted both the 1962 initiative and
similar proposals in the state legislature, reapportionment would still take
place, just by court decree instead of democratic decision-making.
Accordingly, the Oklahoma Democratic Party barely even tried to fight the
1962 initiative even though two years earlier it had ferociously opposed an
almost identical measure. Similarly, Colorado Republicans in 1974
recognized the threat that the redistricting initiative posed to their
dominance in the state legislature. But they also realized that the 1974
elections, taking place shortly after the Watergate scandal, would be
282This

assumes that the existing gerrymandering is not so egregious that the majority party in the

state legislature only enjoys the support of a minority of the electorate. In none of the twelve cases
does such minority entrenchment appear to have occurred.
283 See

infra Appendix B.
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exceptionally favorable to Democrats and self-proclaimed reformers. They
therefore muted their opposition-which would have been futile anywayto the initiative, and focused on holding onto their seats.
There were no comparably important national developments in 2000,
but the Arizona Republican Party still failed strongly to oppose the
redistricting initiative on the ballot.284 There is no single explanation for
the party's halfhearted resistance; it appears, rather, to have stemmed from
an unusual confluence of factors. First, Arizona Republicans themselves
had earlier proposed a redistricting commission, making it difficult for
them to argue convincingly against the initiative. Second, a number of
prominent Republican executive branch officials declared their support for
the measure, thus hampering legislators' effort to present a vigorous and
unified opposition front. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Arizona
Republic tirelessly editorialized in favor of the initiative and criticized the
measure's opponents.
Newspapers in other states also endorsed
redistricting initiatives, but the persistence and high profile of the
Republic's campaign were unique among the twelve cases that I
examined.2 85
It is now possible to answer this Article's motivating question: Why do
redistricting initiatives succeed and why do they fail?
In short,
redistricting initiatives generally fail because they provoke fierce
opposition from the majority party in the state legislature, which feels
threatened by the possibility of fairer district lines. The majority party
typically raises more money than the initiative's supporters, argues more
creatively and vociferously for its position, and manages to cast the debate
in a light more favorable to it. On the other hand, redistricting initiatives
succeed when for some reason the legislative majority party is unable to
mobilize in opposition.
Sometimes national developments such as
Supreme Court decisions or political groundswells account for this
inability; sometimes local factors such as media coverage or poor tactical
decisions by the majority party are responsible. The default, unfortunately,
is that redistricting initiatives fail, and something out of the ordinary must
transpire for them to prevail at the polls.
284

The Arizona case is the most inexplicable of the twelve, as an initiative that benefited

Democrats passed despite Republican control of the governorship and both chambers of the state
legislature. I should note that I do not find my explanation for weak Republican opposition completely
convincing. Majority parties in other cases faced political environments just as challenging but were
able to mount energetic-and effective-campaigns against redistricting initiatives.
285 In no other case did newspaper support for a measure play nearly as large a role as Arizona
(2000). However, newspaper opposition helped doom initiatives in North Dakota (1973), California
(1982), California (1984), and Ohio (2005).
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B. Lessonsfor the Future
The above analysis of the twelve redistricting initiatives suggests that
the situation for would-be reformers is dire. In general, any measure that
they draft-no matter how well-written or admirable in its policy
implications-will be defeated. The majority party in the state legislature
will rally against the initiative, and reformers will be outspent, outframed,
outcampaigned, and, ultimately, outvoted. It matters little whether the
governor supports the measure, whether newspapers and interest groups
are in favor, or whether the existing electoral districts undermine
everything that democracy stands for. The outcome of the campaign will
still be the same: failure.
But there are a few glimmers of hope for proponents of redistricting
reform. First, and most importantly, history shows that redistricting
initiatives do succeed when they are launched at the same time that
favorable national developments are taking place. The challenge, then, is
to identify propitious moments for reform in the future. Unfortunately,
such moments are more apparent with the benefit of hindsight, but it does
seem like we may currently be on the verge of one. Thanks to the
California and Ohio initiatives in 2005, the uproar over Texas's middecade redistricting, and the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Vieth v.
Jubelirer2 86 and LULAC v. Perry,287 redistricting is in the news more than
ever before. Moreover, though it is still too early to tell for certain, the
2008 elections look like they will be favorable for Democrats 288 -who,
outside of California, have been the main supporters of redistricting reform
in the modem era. The combination of greater public awareness of
redistricting abuses and a pro-Democratic political environment may
produce an unusually auspicious setting for redistricting initiatives. If
current trends hold, reformers should be sure not to let the opportunity slip
away.
What happens if, as will usually be the case, there are no favorable
national developments but a redistricting initiative is nevertheless on a
state's ballot? In such a situation, reformers should learn as much as
possible from the 2000 Arizona campaign, the one modem case in which a
redistricting initiative prevailed despite the absence of any dramatic
national events. One lesson from Arizona is that reformers should try not
286541 U.S. 267 (2004).
287 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
288 See Congress 2008, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/cong2008.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007) (showing that Democrats enjoy double-digit advantage in generic Congressional
ballot in most polls).
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only to win major newspapers' endorsements, but also to garner their
committed and vocal support. An unrelenting editorial campaign on behalf
of an initiative, like that mounted by the Arizona Republic in 2000, has the
capacity to focus the public's attention on redistricting and embarrass
opponents of the measure. Media backing is especially important for
proponents of redistricting reform since they are typically at a disadvantage
when it comes to conventional campaigning and television advertising.
A second lesson from Arizona is that it is vitally important for an
initiative's supporters to create rifts in the legislative majority party. State
legislators from the majority party are, of course, the politicians least likely
to back a redistricting measure, but they may be convinced to do so if they
hold seats that would be safe under virtually any electoral arrangement, or
if they are unusually reform-minded. Several Republican members of the
Arizona state legislature, for instance, came out in support of Proposition
106 in 2000.29 A more promising way for reformers to sow dissension in
the majority party's ranks, though, is to target the party's current and
former executive branch officials. Such officials have much less to lose
than state legislators if redistricting is entrusted to a neutral commission,
and they are also more likely to buck the party establishment, especially if
they no longer hold elected office. The most important Republican
supporters of Proposition 106 in 2000 were all past and present executive
branch officials.
A final bit of advice for reformers, derived from the failed campaigns of
Ohio (1981), California (1990), California (2005), and Ohio (2005), is that
they must at all costs maintain unity in the legislative minority party. In
those four races, whatever hopes the initiatives' backers had were dashed
29
by tepid support from, or outright splits in, the minority party. 0
Unfortunately, the best way to prevent minority party defection is for
reformers to propose measures that are unthreatening to minority party
politicians-and hence less likely to produce genuinely fair district maps.
The common theme in the four cases above is that each measure would
have imperiled the seats not only of majority party legislators, but also of
many minority party politicians. The 1981 Ohio initiative would have
made district compactness the sole redistricting criterion; the 1990
289See

Right of Citizens, supra note 218 (noting that Republican State Senator Sue Grace and State

Representative Susan Gerard supported the Arizona redistricting initiative).
290 It is true that legislative minority party support for redistricting reform was also weak in
Oklahoma (1962) and Colorado (1974), but the initiatives nevertheless passed. However, this is almost
certainly because the major national developments in each case made the intensity of local party
support almost irrelevant. In more typical campaigns, the absence of minority party mobilization does
indeed always prove fatal to an initiative's chances.
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California initiative would have required the commission to consider
district competitiveness when choosing among plans; the 2005 California
initiative would have barred the commission from examining the party
affiliations or voting histories of the electorate; and the 2005 Ohio
initiative would have made competitiveness the most important factor in
redistricting. Reformers, then, should avoid proposing schemes that
promise to change most districts' shapes (as the 1981 Ohio initiative would
have), or to make reelection more difficult for minority party legislators (as
the other three measures would have). The proposals that are left may
seem watered-down, but they would still dramatically improve the status
quo-and, crucially, have a prayer of passing.
In sum, the playbook for advocates of redistricting reform should read
as follows: Wait for favorable national developments to take place, and
launch redistricting initiatives in their wake. If a measure is not buoyed by
important national events, try to win the enthusiastic support of major
newspapers, to peel off some members of the legislative majority party in
the state, and to avoid proposals that are overly threatening to minority
party legislators' job security. Even if all these goals are met, of course,
the initiative may fail. But at least reformers will have learned the right
lessons from the few successful initiative campaigns, and avoided
repeating all the mistakes of the eight failed campaigns-not one of which
featured a unified minority party, a divided majority party, and support for
the measure from the state's media establishment.
C. Implicationsfor the Academic Conventional Wisdom
Section II.A, supra, presented the variables that, according to political
scientists, best explain the outcomes of popular initiatives. These variables
include campaign spending, especially when deployed against a measure;
voters' appraisal of a measure's merits; the positions taken by elites, in
particular interest groups and the media; and the framing of a measure by
its supporters and detractors. On the other hand, political scientists tend to
downplay the importance of political parties, arguing that parties rarely
take positions on initiatives and that voters in initiative elections are
deprived of the partisan cues that assist their decision-making in candidate
elections. 291 How accurate is the academic conventional wisdom on
initiative outcomes (at least in the redistricting context)?
291See

supra note 50. The scholarly consensus on political parties is not absolute, though. Regina

Branton, for example, analyzed initiative outcomes across a range of states and issues, and found that
there is a "more general relationship between partisanship and voting behavior in ballot elections than
previously hypothesized," and that "although [initiative] elections lack traditional partisan labels, voters
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Not very. First, several of the factors identified as significant by
political scientists are unhelpful in explaining why redistricting initiatives
succeed or fail. For instance, initiative supporters outspent opponents in 292
at
cases.
those
of
one
only
in
prevailed
but
least four campaigns
Initiatives' merits also could not have played too large a causal role since
all twelve of the measures were relatively similar-seeking to combat
gerrymandering by creating redistricting commissions that would draw
district lines on the basis of specified criteria-but their fates at the polls
diverged widely. As noted above, the Oklahoma (1960) and Oklahoma
(1962) initiatives were almost identical, but the former passed while the
latter was defeated; and the successful initiatives in Colorado (1974) and
Arizona (2000) closely resembled the four failed California initiatives.
Interest group and media positions seem relatively unimportant as well,
since initiatives usually fail even when strongly backed by major groups
and newspapers. Arizona (2000) is the only case where media support for
a measure was an important reason for success at the polls, and it must be
weighed against Oklahoma (1960), Ohio (1981), California (1982), and
California (2005), all cases where initiatives were defeated despite strong
interest group and newspaper backing.
Not only are the variables identified by political scientists unable to
explain the outcomes of redistricting initiative elections, but the most
important causal factor-the position of the legislative majority party and
the intensity with which it is held-is one that the academic literature
typically neglects. This Article's analysis of the twelve redistricting
initiatives shows that the measures universally failed when they were
strongly opposed by the majority party in the state, and universally
succeeded when the majority party was split or only weakly opposed. This
finding would come as a complete surprise to observers such as Cronin,
Magleby, Gerber, and Lupia, all of whom argue that the absence of
obvious partisan cues in initiative elections deprives parties of their usual
rely on cues to formulate a decision on ballot initiatives." Regina P. Branton, Examining IndividualLevel Voting Behavior on State Ballot Propositions,56 POL. RESEARCH Q. 367, 368, 372 (2003); see
also Hasen, supra note 50, at 734 ("[P]arties no longer are passive observers of the initiative process...
. Though it would be premature to consider parties as 'major players' in the process, the data show that
parties are highly adaptable organizations, making selective use of initiative campaigns as part of their
set of political tools.").
292 See infra Appendix B. In the one campaign where a redistricting initiative's supporters clearly
outspent its opponents, Oklahoma (1962), the extra funding was almost certainly not decisive. As
discussed above, see supra Part II.B.3, the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote decision earlier that
year was the most important reason why that measure passed. It is worth noting, however, that as
scholars would expect, every time that a redistricting measure's opponents were better-funded, the
measure was defeated.
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electoral clout. 293 These scholars (along with most of the political science
establishment) believe that parties do not matter in initiative elections, but
not only do parties matter in the redistricting context, they matter more
than any other variable.
There are three reasons why the academic conventional wisdom is so
wrong about redistricting initiatives.
First, and most importantly,
redistricting initiatives are fundamentally different from other exercises in
direct democracy because they are designed to upset the political balance
of power. Political scientists may be right that parties do not get too
exercised over fiscal, environmental, or legal initiatives, but it stands to
reason that they will be far more involved in campaigns over measures that
could sharply enhance or undercut their political prospects. Other interest
groups also have less at stake in redistricting initiative elections, meaning
that it is easier for parties to assume the lead role in the debate. Second,
political scientists are inclined to minimize the relevance of political
parties across all initiative contexts. If this perspective is flawed and
parties are generally more influential than was previously thought to be the
case, as some recent evidence suggests, 294 the error will be especially
severe in the arena where parties have the most to gain and lose. Third, no
political scientist has ever conducted a detailed analysis of all the
redistricting initiatives that have taken place over the course of American
history. (Nor, to be fair, has anybody else.) But without such an analysis
it is impossible to assess accurately the importance of political parties in
redistricting initiative elections-especially since party positions and the
manner in which they influence campaigns are not very susceptible to
quantification and statistical study. This Article's methodology, and the
unexpected results it produced, thus suggest a need for more case studystyle investigations of popular initiatives (and other political science
phenomena as well). Case studies tend to be more laborious to generate
than multiple regressions, but they can also reveal insights that are
otherwise lost in the statistical fog.
CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to answer two questions about redistricting
initiatives, which after Vieth and LULAC represent the only realistic way to
curb political gerrymandering. First, are redistricting initiatives (and the
293 See
294

supranote 50.
See supra note 290.
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redistricting commissions they invariably seek to create) a good idea?
Second, and more importantly, why do redistricting initiatives generally
fail, and what can reformers do to improve such measures' odds of success
in the future? Part I made the case for redistricting initiatives and
redistricting commissions. Redistricting initiatives unblock stoppages in
the democratic process, thereby allowing the public to enact electoral
reform over the opposition of self-interested legislators. And redistricting
commissions are in theory better suited to district-drawing than state
legislatures, and empirically have produced more competitive elections and
more representative results.
Part II, the heart of the Article, first discussed a series of variables that
might be expected to influence initiative outcomes. The section then
examined in detail the twelve redistricting initiatives that have taken place
over the course of American history. For each initiative campaign, the
measure's supporters and opponents (as well as their principal arguments)
were described, and tentative explanations for the measure's eventual
success or failure were proposed. Part III, finally, considered the twelve
redistricting initiatives holistically in search of broader explanations for
their outcomes and lessons applicable to future campaigns. The section's
main finding was that, contrary to the academic conventional wisdom,
redistricting initiatives always fail when they are strongly opposed by the
majority party in the state legislature. If reformers are to have any hope of
success, they need to find some way-e.g. capitalizing on favorable
national developments, winning the enthusiastic support of a state's media
establishment, sowing dissension between the majority party's executive
branch officials and its legislators-to defuse majority party opposition.
This finding is especially ironic because it undermines one of the
central premises of direct democracy: that it enables the people to bypass
the legislature and enact desired policies despite the politicians' resistance.
If redistricting initiatives fail when they are strongly opposed by most
legislators, and succeed when they are not, then they seem to be no
different from conventional legislation.
There are, however, two
characteristics of redistricting initiatives that distinguish them from regular
bills and make them (slightly) more likely to become law. First, they may
be (and usually are) placed on the ballot by groups other than state
legislators. This means that redistricting reform may become a major
political issue even when there is nothing that elected officials would
rather talk about less.
Second, redistricting campaigns have a way of unfolding unpredictably.
Polls gyrate up and down, media barrages shift public opinion back and
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forth, party fissures are revealed and then healed, national developments
intercede, and so on. The final outcome may usually be defeat for the proinitiative side, but there is at least more volatility, and hence more hope, in
initiative campaigns than in state legislative chambers. Proponents of
redistricting reform, then, should not yet conclude that the direct
democracy game is not worth the candle. The odds of success for
redistricting initiatives are low-but they are not zero, and they are higher
than the probability of meaningful legislative or judicial action.
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APPENDIX A: FEATURES OF THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES
State Year Success

Level

AR

1936

Yes

State

OK

1960

No

State

OK

1962

Yes

State

ND

1973

No

State

CO

1974

Yes

State

OH

1981

No

State
Sate
and

Commission Composition
Redistricting Criteria
Commission draws districts with equal
Three members: governor,
population that are contiguous and do not secretary of state, and attorney
divide counties.
general.
Commission enforces standards already
Three members: attorney
in OK constitution; each county
general, treasurer, and
guaranteed one House member; removed
ge
rear ,and
ceiling on House members per county.
secretary of state.
Commission enforces standards already
Three members: attorney
in Oklahoma constitution; constitutional
general, treasurer, and
formula is unchanged.
secretary of state.
Nine members: two each
picked by Senate majority and
Commission draws single-member
minority leaders, and House
districts with equal population.
majority and minority leaders;
the eight then a chairman.
Commission draws districts while
Eleven members: four picked
considering equal population,
by legislature, three by
compactness, contiguity, and preservation
judiciary
of political boundaries and communities
judiciary.
interest.
of
Five members: two
Commission chooses among submitted Democrats, two Republicans,

plans, on basis of district compactness. and a fifth member chosen by
the first four.
Ten members: four selected
Commission draws districts while
State
considering equal population,
by appellate judges, four
and
co
nssd
eual
polti,
selected
by Senate
federalfdrlboundaries.
compactness, and respect for political Assembly
sem
ypat
cuuefuand fou
party caucuses,
federal

CA

1982

No

selected by party chairmen.
CA

1984

No

State
and
federal

CA

1990

No

State
and
federal

Commission draws districts while
considering competitiveness,
compactness, respect for political
boundaries, and equal population.
Commission chooses among submitted
plans, on basis of equal population,
minority group power, respect for county
boundaries, compactness, contiguity,
respect for political boundaries, and
competitiveness.
Commission draws districts while
considering equal population,
compactness, contiguity, preservation of
political boundaries and communities of
interest, and competitiveness,
Commission draws districts while
considering equal population and
minimization of county and city splitting,
and ignoring party affiliations of voters.

AZ

2000

Yes

State
and
federal

CA

2005

No

State
and
federal
federal

OH

2005

No

tateCFive
and
Commission chooses among submitted
plans, on basis of competitiveness.
federal
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Eight members: all retired
judges selected by lottery,
four from each major party.
Twelve members: ten from
major parties and two
independents, picked by
judges.
Five members: appellate court
picks twenty-five candidates;
state legislature leaders pick
four commissioners; those
four pick chair.
I'ree members: retired judges
throsen bymlicate leadera
ough complicated formula.
members, two chosen by
sitting judges; those two then
pick remainder.
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APPENDIX

B: FACTORS IN REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES' SUCCESS OR
FAILURE

Majority Majority Minority
Governor
Side
party
party
party
position
State Year Success spending Governorposiioniositonoprtyiart
position
stin
strength position
more
strength
AR
OK
OK
ND
CO
OH
CA
CA
CA
AZ
CA
OH

1936
1960
1962
1973
1974
1981
1982
1984
1990
2000
2005
2005

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

State Year Success

Unclear
Unclear
For
For
Unclear
For
For
Against
Against
Unclear
Against
Against

Vote

Unclear
For
For
For
Unclear
For
Against
For
For
Unclear
For
Against

Editorial position
of most
newspapers

AR
OK
OK
ND
CO
OH
CA
CA
CA
AZ
CA
OH

1936
1960
19621
1973
1974
1981
1982
1984
1990
2000
2005
2005

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

66-34
35-65
55-45
45-55
60-40
42-58
45-55
45-55
36-64
56-44
40-60
30-70

Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak

For
For
For
Against
Split
Split
Against
Against
Split
For
For
Against

Unclear
Against
Against
Against
Against
Against*
Against
Against
Against
Split
Against
Against

Interest
group

Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong

Recent
egregious

positions gerrymander
Unclear
Split
Split
Split
For
For
For
Split
Split
For
Split
Split

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Unclear
For
For
For
For
For*
For
For
Split
For
Split
For

Major
natonl
developments
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Minority
party
position
strength
Weak
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak

effective
Morevnal
framing
For
Against
Unclear
Against
Unclear
Against
Against
Against
Against
For
Unclear
Against

* Control over the Ohio state legislature was split in 1981, with Democratic control of the House
and Republican control of the Senate.
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